The Divine Authority of Scriptures: Unveiling Its Source and Debunking Papist Claims
Francis Turretin
From what source does the divine authority of the Scriptures become known to us? Does it depend upon the testimony of the church either as to itself or as to us? We deny against the papists
Occasion of the question.
I. The object of the papists in this and other controversies set forth by them concerning the Scriptures, is obvious, viz., to avoid the tribunal of Scripture (in which they do not find sufficient help for the defense of their errors) and to appeal to the church (i.e., to the pope himself) and thus become judges in their own cause. Hence, as we treated before of the doctrine of Scripture (whether it agreed with itself or not), we must now inquire concerning the Scriptures themselves whether it is proper that religious controversies should be decided by their authority and testimony. For this purpose a sharp discussion has been kept up concerning its origin and necessity, its perfection and perspicuity, the integrity and purity of the canon and especially concerning its authority; if not entirely to destroy it, nevertheless to weaken it greatly. Thus what Irenaeus says concerning the heretics of his day is appropriate to them: “When they are convicted from Scripture, they turn round and accuse the Scripture, as being corrupt, and having no authority” (Irenaeus, Against Heresies 3.2 [ANF 1:415; PG 7.846]).
Some papists speak harshly; others more calmly.
II. But we must here observe that some speak roughly, others more calmly on this subject. For some (gymnē tē kephalē, without wish of concealment) altogether deny the authenticity (authentian) of Scripture in itself without the testimony of the church and think it worthy of no more belief (I shudder to relate) than the Koran, Titus Livy or the fables of Aesop. In a former age those who undertook to dispute with our men concerning the authority of Scripture belched forth these blasphemies. Such are the impious words of Hosius against Brentius (“Confutatio Prolegomenon Brentii,” in Opera [1583], 1:530). He asserts that it can be said in a pious sense that “the Scriptures have only as much force as the fables of Aesop, if destitute of the authority of the church.” Eck says that “the Scriptures are not authentic, except by authority of the church” (Enchirdion of Commonplaces 1 [trans. F.L. Battles, 1979], p. 13, “On the Church and her Authority”). Baile says that “without the authority of the church we should no more believe Matthew than Titus Livy” (cf. Andre Rivet, Sommaire de toutes les controverses touchant la religion [1615], p. 217). Andradius says, “There is nothing of divinity in the books in which the sacred mysteries are written and that there cannot be found in them anything to bind us to religion and to believe what they contain; but that the power and dignity of the church are so great as that no one without the greatest impiety can resist it” (Defensio tridentinae fidei catholicae 3+ [1580]). Stapleton says, “The church must be considered in such a light, as that we ought not to believe the testimony in any other way than the apostles believed the testimony of Christ, and that God is not to be believed except on account of the church” (adversus Whittak., lib. i, c. 7+ [1620]). But because others saw that this was deservedly censured by our men as impious and blasphemous, they have spoken more cautiously in thus declaring their opinion. They confess the Scriptures absolutely and in themselves to be authentic and divine, as coming from God (the source of all truth), but yet they say that (relatively and as to us) they have not that authority except on account of the testimony of the church, through whose kindness they become known and are received by us as divine. Hence arose the distinction of authority (“as to itself” [absolute] and “as to us” [relative]) which Bellarmine (“De conciliis Auctoritate,” 2.12 in Opera [1857], 2:61), Stapleton (“De Principiis fidei doctrinalibus controversia,” Cont. 5*.1 in Opera [1620], 1:311–12 and “Authoritatis ecclesiasticae,” 2.11 in Opera [1620], 1:1019–24) and others have advanced.
III. But in whatever manner they explain their opinion (if we properly consider the thing itself), we will find that this distinction has been framed to deceive and to remove the odium attaching to their impious doctrine rather than to unfold the truth of the thing itself. As authority belongs to the genus of things related ek tōn pros ti, it should not be considered absolutely but relatively. Therefore Scripture cannot be authentic in itself without being so as to us. For the same arguments which prove it authoritative in itself ought to induce us to assent to its authenticity as to us; but if its authority as to us is suspended upon the church as the formal reason for which I believe the Scriptures to be divine, it follows that its authority as to itself must also be suspended upon the same. Indeed others have more plainly confessed this. That this is really their opinion may be satisfactorily gathered from the other controversies in which they here engage. For how could they deny either its perfection or perspicuity or purity, if they believed it to be authentic in itself.
Statement of the question.
IV. To exhibit the state of the question, the question is not whether the Bible is authentic and divine, for this our opponents do not deny or at least wish to appear to believe. Rather the question is Whence is it made known to us as such, or by what argument can this inspiration be proved to us? The papists suspend this authority upon the testimony of the church and maintain that the principal motive by which we are induced to believe the authenticity (authentian) of the Scriptures is the voice of the church. But although we do not deny that the testimony of the church has its own weight (as will afterwards be seen), yet we maintain that primarily and principally the Bible is believed by us to be divine on account of itself (or the marks impressed upon it), not on account of the church.
V. Second, it is not asked concerning the foundation or efficient cause of the faith by which we believe the divinity of the Scriptures (i.e., whether the Holy Spirit applies it to us or not). For this belongs to another question concerning free will, and our opponents acknowledge it with us (Stapleton, “Triplicatio inchoata adversus … Whitakerum,” 9 in Opera [1620], 1:1166–71; Canus, “De Locis Theologicis,” 2.8 in Opera [1605], pp. 41–53). Rather the question concerns the argument or principal motive which the Spirit uses in persuading us of its truth; whether it is the direct argument of the testimony of the church (as the papists say) or the rational, derived from the marks of the Scripture itself (which we hold).
VI. As a threefold cause can be granted for the manifestation of anything (an objective, efficient and instrumental or organic), so a threefold question can arise about the divinity of the Bible: the first, concerning the argument on account of which I believe; the second, concerning the principle or efficient cause from which I am led to believe; the third, concerning the means and instrument through which I believe. And to this triple question a triple reply can be given. For the Bible with its own marks is the argument on account of which I believe. The Holy Spirit is the efficient cause and principle from which I am induced to believe. But the church is the instrument and means through which I believe. Hence if the question is why, or on account of what, do I believe the Bible to be divine, I will answer that I do so on account of the Scripture itself which by its marks proves itself to be such. If it is asked whence or from what I believe, I will answer from the Holy Spirit who produces that belief in me. Finally, if I am asked by what means or instrument I believe it, I will answer through the church which God uses in delivering the Scriptures to me.
VII. Third, the question does not concern the motive or the introductory (eisagōgikō) and ministerial (leitourgikō) means, whose assistance the Holy Spirit uses in persuading us of the authority of the Scriptures. This we readily concede to the church. Rather the question concerns the principal argument and motive by which we are brought to faith (not human, but divine) which they place in the church. We believe it is not to be found out of Scripture itself.
VIII. Fourth, the question is not whether divine revelation is the formal reason (simply and absolutely) of our faith, for this our opponents acknowledge with us. Rather the question is What is that first and clearest revelation with respect to us which ought to be received through and on account of itself, and not on account of some other better known to us and therefore the most common and the first principle of faith by which all things ought to be proved, but itself by none prior to it whether that revelation is to be looked for in the Scriptures or in the church? We think that revelation to be contained in the Bible itself which is the first and infallible truth and rule of faith. But papists maintain that it must be sought in the voice and testimony of the church. Stapleton says, “Now therefore the voice of the church is the supreme external testimony on earth” (“Auctoritatis ecclesiasticae,” 1.8 in Opera [1620], 1:893); and “God speaking by the church speaks not otherwise than if he spoke immediately by visions and dreams, or some other supernatural manner of revelation” (ibid., 1.9, p. 902); and “the whole formal reason of our faith is God revealing by the church” (ibid., 1.14.12, p. 926). Gretser says, “the testimony of the church alone is a fit answer to the question, whence do you know that the Scripture is divinely revealed?” (?“Tractatus de Quaestione, Unde scis scripturam cum generatim …,” 7+ in Opera Omnia [1734–41], 8:961–1003). Bellarmine says, “It is true that we do not certainly know what God has revealed except from the testimony of the church” (VD 3.10, response to argument 13, p. 114); and “Catholics believe what they do because God has revealed it, and they believe that God revealed it because they hear the church so speaking and declaring” (“De gratia et libero arbitrio,” 6.3 in Opera [1858], 4:435–36).
IX. The question then amounts to this—why, or on account of what, do we believe that the Bible is the word of God; or what argument does the Holy Spirit principally use to convince us of the inspiration of the Scriptures? The testimony and voice of the church, or the marks impressed upon Scripture itself? Our opponents assert the former; we the latter.
The authority of the Scriptures does not depend upon the testimony of the church.
X. That the authority of the Scriptures either as to itself or as to us does not depend upon the testimony of the church is proved: (1) because the church is built upon the Scripture (Eph. 2:20) and borrows all authority from it. Our opponents cannot deny this since, when we ask them about the church, they quickly fly to the Scriptures to prove it. Therefore the church cannot recommend the authority of Scripture either as to itself or as to us, unless we wish to make the cause depend upon the effect, the principle upon that which derived from it and the foundation upon the edifice. Nor ought the objection to be brought up here (that both may be true) that the church borrows its authority from the Scriptures, and the Scriptures in turn from the church (just as John bore testimony to Christ who also himself gave testimony to John). For it is one thing to give testimony to someone as a minister, as John testified concerning Christ, that through him (di’autou), not on account of him (di’auton), the Jews might believe (Jn. 1:7). It is quite a different thing to give authority to him as a lord which Christ did to John. (2) The authority of the church would be prior to that of the Scriptures and so would be the first thing to be believed (upon which our faith at first would depend and into which it would finally be resolved), which our opponents, who make the authority of the church depend upon Scripture, would not admit. (3) A manifest circle would be made since the authority of the church is proved from Scripture, and in turn the authority of the Scripture from the church. (4) Our opponents are not yet agreed as to what is meant by the church—whether the modern or the ancient, the collective or the representative, a particular or the universal; or what is the act testifying concerning the authority of Scripture (whether enacted by some judicial sentence or exercised by a continuous and successive tradition). (5) A fallible and human testimony (as that of the church) cannot form the foundation of divine faith. And if God now speaks through the church, does it therefore follow that she is infallible because there is one kind of inspiration which is special and extraordinary (such as made the apostles and prophets infallible [anamartētous], and of which Christ speaks properly when he says that the Holy Spirit would lead the apostles into all truth, Jn. 16:13*); another common and ordinary which does not make pastors inspired (theopneustous).
But is proved by itself.
XI. That the Scripture makes itself known to us is proved: (1) by the nature of the Scripture itself. For as a law does not derive its authority from the subordinate judges who interpret it or from the heralds who promulgate it, but from its author alone—as a will obtains its weight not from the notary to whom it is entrusted, but from the purpose of the testator; as a rule has the power of ruling from its own innate perfection, not from the artificer who uses it—so the Scripture which is the law of the supreme lawgiver, the will of our heavenly Father and the inflexible (aklinēs) rule of faith, cannot have authority even as to us from the church, but only from itself. (2) By the nature of the highest genera and of first principles; for those things are known by themselves and are not susceptible (anapodeikta) of proof which cannot be demonstrated by any other, otherwise the thing would go on to infinity. Hence Basil says “it is necessary that the first principles of every science should be self-evident” (anankē hekastēs mathēseōs anexetastous einai tas archas, In Psalmum cxv homilia, PG 30.104–5). Thus Scripture, which is the first principle in the supernatural order, is known by itself and has no need of arguments derived from without to prove and make itself known to us. If God has stamped such marks upon all first principles that they can be known at once by all men, we cannot doubt that he has placed them upon this sacred first principle (in the highest degree necessary to our salvation). (3) By comparison, as objects of the sense presented to faculties well disposed are immediately distinguished and known without any other external argument, on account of a secret adaptation and propensity of the faculty to the object. Light is immediately most certainly known to us by its own brightness; food by its peculiar sweetness; an odor by its peculiar fragrance without any additional testimony. Thus the Scripture, which is set forth to us in respect to the new man and spiritual senses, now under the symbol of a clear light (Ps. 119:105), then of the most sweetest food (Ps. 19:10; Is. 55:1, 2; Heb. 5:14) and again of the sweetest smelling savor (Cant. 1:3), may easily be distinguished of itself by the senses of the new man as soon as it is presented to them and makes itself known by its own light, sweetness and fragrance (euōdia); so that there is no need to seek elsewhere for proof that this is light, food or a sweet smelling savor. (4) By the testimony of our opponents who prove the inspiration of the Scriptures by its own marks; Bellarmine says, “Nothing is better known, nothing more certain than the sacred Scriptures contained in the writings of the prophets and apostles, so that he must be in the highest degree foolish who refuses to believe in them” (VD 1.2, p. 24); see Cano, “De Locis Theologicis,” 2.8 in Opera (1605), pp. 41–53; Gregory de Valentia, Analysis fidei catholicae 1.15 (1585), pp. 51–53; (Peter) Soto, Defensio Catholicae Confessionis 47 (1557), pp. 56–58.
Sources of explanation.
XII. We do not deny that the church has many functions in relation to the Scriptures. She is: (1) the keeper of the oracles of God to whom they are committed and who preserves the authentic tables of the covenant of grace with the greatest fidelity, like a notary (Rom. 3:2); (2) the guide, to point out the Scriptures and lead us to them (Is. 30:21); (3) the defender, to vindicate and defend them by separating the genuine books from the spurious, in which sense she may be called the ground (hedraiōma) of the truth (1 Tim. 3:15*); (4) the herald who sets forth and promulgates them (2 Cor. 5:19; Rom. 10:16); (5) the interpreter inquiring into the unfolding of the true sense. But all these imply a ministerial only and not a magisterial power. Through her indeed, we believe, but not on account of her; as through John the Baptist the faithful believed in Christ, not on account of him (Jn. 1:7); and through the Samaritan woman Christ was known by the Samaritans, not on account of her (Jn. 4:39).
XIII. The resolution of faith objectively considered (as to the things to be believed) is different from its subjective or formal consideration (as to the act of believing). The former is in Scripture and the external testimony of the Holy Spirit expressed in Scripture; the latter in its internal testimony impressed upon the conscience and speaking in the heart. For as two things are necessary to the generating of faith (the presentation of truth in the word and the application of it in the heart), the Holy Spirit operates in both (i.e., in the word and in the heart). Therefore he is said properly to testify in the word objectively after the manner of an argument on account of which we believe. In the heart, he is also said (but with less propriety) to testify efficiently and after the manner of a first principle, by the power of which we believe. In this sense, the Spirit (who is reckoned among the witnesses of the divinity of Christ and of the truth of the gospel) is said to “bear witness that the Spirit is truth” (1 Jn. 5:6), i.e., the Spirit working in the hearts of believers bears witness that the doctrine of the gospel delivered by the Spirit is true and divine.
XIV. Article 4 of the French Confession says, “We know that the books of Scripture are canonical, not so much from the common consent of the church, as from the internal testimony and persuasion of the Holy Spirit” (Cochrane, 145). Hence, we must understand by the Holy Spirit, the Spirit’s speaking both in the word and in the heart. For the same Spirit who acts objectively in the word by presenting the truth, operates efficiently in the heart also by impressing that truth upon our minds. Thus he is very different from a Spirit of enthusiasm.
XV. The private judgment of the Spirit (which is such subjectively with regard to the subject in which it inheres) is different from that which is such originally because it depends upon man’s own will. The former we allow here, but not the latter. For the Spirit that testifies in us concerning the inspiration of the Scriptures is not peculiar to individuals with regard to the principle and origin. Rather he is common to the whole church and so to all believers in whom he works the same faith, although he is such subjectively with regard to each individual because he is given separately to each believer.
XVI. Although the church is more ancient than the Scriptures formally considered (and as to the mode of writing), yet it cannot be called such with respect to the Scriptures materially considered (and as to the substance of doctrine) because the word of God is more ancient than the church itself, being its foundation and seed. The question does not concern the testimony of the ancient church of the patriarchs (which existed before the Scriptures), but of the Christian church, long after them.
XVII. Although believers are persuaded by the testimony of the Holy Spirit of the inspiration of the Scriptures, it does not therefore follow that all who possess the Spirit should agree in receiving equally every book. Since he is not given to all in an equal measure, so neither does he furnish all with an equal knowledge both as to the principle of religion and as to its doctrines, nor move them to assent by an equal power. Hence some Protestants might doubt concerning one or another canonical book because they were not yet sufficiently enlightened by the Holy Spirit.
XVIII. It is not always necessary that a thing should be proved by something else. For there are some things which are self-evident according to the philosophers (as the highest categories of things, and ultimate differences and first principles) which are not susceptible of demonstration, but are evident by their own light and are taken for granted as certain and indubitable. If perchance anyone denies them, he is not to be met with arguments, but should be committed to the custody of his kinsmen (as a madman); or to be visited with punishment, as one (according to Aristotle) either lacking sense or needing punishment. Aristotle says there are certain axioms which do not have an external reason for their truth “which must necessarily be and appear to be such per se” (ho anankē einai di’ auto kai dokein anankē, Posterior Analytics 1.10 [Loeb, 70–71]); i.e., they are not only credible (autopiston) of themselves, but cannot be seriously denied by anyone of a sound mind. Therefore since the Bible is the first principle and the primary and infallible truth, is it strange to say that it can be proved by itself? The Bible can prove itself either one part or another when all parts are not equally called into doubt (as when we convince the Jews from the Old Testament); or the whole proving the whole, not by a direct argument of testimony (because it declares itself divine), but by that made artfully (artificiali) and ratiocinative (because in it are discovered divine marks which are not found in the writings of men). Nor is this a begging of the question because these criteria are something distinct from the Scriptures; if not materially, yet formally as adjuncts and properties which are demonstrated with regard to the subject. Nor is one thing proved by another equally unknown because they are better known by us; as we properly prove a cause from its effects, a subject by its properties. The argument of the papists that Scripture cannot be proved by itself (because then it would be more known and more unknown than itself) can with much greater force be turned against the church.
XIX. If any deny the inspiration of the Scriptures, it is not because the object in itself is not known or understandable, but because they are destitute of a well-disposed faculty. To them the gospel is hid because Satan has blinded their eyes (2 Cor. 4:4); as some deny God (who is most capable of being known) because they are fools, or do not see the sun because they are blind; as the blind woman in Seneca complained that the sun did not rise. Yet notwithstanding this the sun always sends forth his rays, which are perceived per se by those who have eyes.
XX. It is one thing to discern and to declare the canon of Scripture; quite another to establish the canon itself and to make it authentic. The church cannot do the latter (as this belongs to God alone, the author of Scripture), but it does only the former, which belongs to it ministerially, not magisterially. As the goldsmith who separates the dross from the gold (or who proves it by a touchstone) distinguishes indeed the pure from the adulterated, but does not make it pure (either as to us or as to itself), so the church by its test distinguishes indeed canonical books from those which are not and from apocryphal, but does not make them such. Nor can the judgment of the church give authority to the books which they do not possess of themselves; rather she declares the already existing authority by arguments drawn from the books themselves.
XXI. The knowledge of a thing may be confused or distinct. The church can be known before the Scriptures by a confused knowledge, but a distinct knowledge of the Scriptures ought to precede because the truth of the church can be ascertained only from the Scriptures. The church can be apprehended by us before the Scriptures by a human faith, as an assembly of men using the same sacred things; yet it can be known and believed as an assembly of believers and the communion of saints by a divine faith, only after the marks of the church which Scripture supplies have become known.
XXII. When the apostle says that “faith is by hearing” (Rom. 10:17), he does indeed give us to understand that the ministry of the church ought to come in as the ordinary means of producing faith in adults. He does not teach, however, that the church is clearer and better known than the Scriptures.
XXIII. To inquire concerning the number, the authors, parts and single words of the sacred books is different from inquiring concerning the fundamental doctrines contained in them. The latter knowledge pertains to every believer, but not the former. Nor will his salvation be in jeopardy who cannot tell who wrote the gospel of Matthew, provided he believes the book to be authentic and divine. The knowledge of the primary author of any book is one thing; that of the amanuensis is another. The latter belongs only to an historical faith, but the former to a divine.
XXIV. Since the circle (according to philosophers) is a sophistical argument (by which the same thing is proved by itself) and is occupied about the same kind of cause in a circuit coming back without end into itself, the circle cannot be charged upon us when we prove the Scriptures by the Spirit, and in turn the Spirit from the Scriptures. For here the question is diverse and the means or kind of cause is different. We prove the Scriptures by the Spirit as the efficient cause by which we believe. But we prove the Spirit from the Scriptures as the object and argument on account of which we believe. In the first, the answer is to the question Whence or by what power do you believe the Scriptures to be inspired? (viz., by the Spirit). But in the second, the answer is to the question Why or on account of what do you believe that the Spirit in you is the Holy Spirit? (viz., on account of the marks of the Holy Spirit which are in the Scriptures). But the papists (who charge the circle upon us) evidently run into it themselves in this question, when they prove the Scriptures by the church and the church by the Scriptures; for this is done by the same means and by the same kind of cause. If we ask why or on account of what they believe the Scriptures to be divine, they answer because the church says so. If we ask again, why they believe the church, they reply because the Scriptures ascribe infallibility to her when they call her the pillar and ground of the truth. If we press upon them whence they know this testimony of Scripture to be credible (autopiston), they add because the church assures us of it. Thus they are rolled back again to the commencement of the dispute and go on to infinity, never stopping in any first credible thing. Nor is the question here diverse. In both instances, the question concerns the reason and argument on account of which I believe; not the faculty or principle by which I believe.
XXV. The church is called “the pillar and ground of the truth” (stylos kai hedraiōma tēs alētheias, 1 Tim. 3:15) not because she supports and gives authority to the truth (since the truth is rather the foundation upon which the church is built, Eph. 2:20), but because it stands before the church as a pillar and makes itself conspicuous to all. Therefore it is called a pillar, not in an architectural sense (as pillars are used for the support of buildings), but in a forensic and political sense (as the edicts of the emperor and the decrees and laws of the magistrates were usually posted against pillars before the court houses and praetoria and before the gates of the basilica so that all might be informed of them, as noted by Pliny, Natural History, lib. 6, c. 28+ and Josephus,? AJ 1.70–71 [Loeb, 4:32–33]). So the church is the pillar of the truth both by reason of promulgating and making it known (because she is bound to promulgate the law of God, and heavenly truth is attached to it so that it may become known to all) and by reason of guarding it. For she ought not only to set it forth, but also to vindicate and defend it. Therefore she is called not only a pillar (stulos), but also a stay (hedraiōma) by which the truth when known may be vindicated and preserved pure and entire against all corruptions. But she is not called a foundation (themelion), in the sense of giving to the truth itself its own substructure (hypostasin) and firmness. (2) Whatever is called the pillar and stay of the truth is not therefore infallible; for so the ancients called those who, either in the splendor of their doctrine or in the holiness of their lives or in unshaken constancy, excelled others and confirmed the doctrines of the gospel and the Christian faith by precept and example; as Eusebius says the believers in Lyons call Attalus the Martyr (Ecclesiastical History 5.1 [FC 19:276]); Basil distinguishes the orthodox bishops who opposed the Arian heresy by this name (hoi styloi kai to hedraiōma tēs alētheias, Letter 243 [70] [FC 28:188; PG 32.908]); and Gregory Nazianzus so calls Athanasius. In the same sense, judges in a pure and uncorrupted republic are called the pillars and stays of the laws. (3) This passage teaches the duty of the church, but not its infallible prerogative (i.e., what she is bound to do in the promulgation and defending of the truth against the corruptions of its enemies, but not what she can always do). In Mal. 2:7, the “priest’s lips” are said to “keep knowledge” because he is bound to do it (although he does not always do it as v. 8 shows). (4) Whatever is here ascribed to the church belongs to the particular church at Ephesus to which, however, the papists are not willing to give the prerogative of infallibility. Again, it treats of the collective church of believers in which Timothy was to labor and exercise his ministry, not as the church representative of the pastors, much less of the pope (in whom alone they think infallibility [anamartēsian] resides). (5) Paul alludes here both to the use of pillars in the temples of the Gentiles (to which were attached either images of the gods or the laws and moral precepts; yea, even oracles, as Pausanius and Athenaeus testify) that he may oppose these pillars of falsehood and error (on which nothing but fictions and the images of false gods were exhibited) to that mystical pillar of truth on which the true image of the invisible God is set forth (Col. 1:15) and the heavenly oracles of God made to appear; and to that remarkable pillar which Solomon caused to be erected in the temple (2 Ch. 6:13; 2 K. 11:14; 23:3) which kings ascended like a scaffold as often as they either addressed the people or performed any solemn service, and was therefore called by the Jews the “royal pillar.” Thus truth sits like a queen upon the church; not that she may derive her authority from it (as Solomon did not get his from that pillar), but that on her, truth may be set forth and preserved.
The passage of Augustine.
XXVI. The passage of Augustine, “I would not believe the gospel if the authority of the church did not move me” (Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called Fundamental 5 [NPNF1, 4:131; PL 42.176]) does not favor the papists. First, Augustine speaks of himself as still a Manichean and not yet a Christian. What he places in the imperfect is equivalent to the preterite pluperfect: “I would believe and it would move” for “I would have believed and it would have moved”—a very common usage with the Africans (as the learned observe); cf. Augustine, “If I would then love that fruit” for “I would have loved” (Confessions 2.8 [FC 21:46; PL 32.682]). Second, the authority of which he speaks is not that of right and power (which our opponents here pretend), as if he would have believed because the church so ordered; but that of worth, derived from the great and remarkable proofs of the providence of God (visible in the church) such as miracles, the agreement of people, the succession, etc. (Augustine, Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called Fundamental 4 [NPNF1, 4:130]) which can lead to faith, although unable to produce it primarily. Third, the external motive to faith is here alluded to and not the infallible principle of believing which chap. 4 teaches us is to be sought in the truth alone. For he acknowledges that truth is to be preferred before everything else, if it is so perfectly exhibited as that it cannot be called into question. “Let us follow those who invite us to believe; first, when we are not as yet able to understand, so that being made more able by the faith itself we may deserve to understand what we believe, having not now men, but God himself as the informer and illuminator of our minds within us” (ibid., 14 [NPNF1, 4:136; PL 42.183]). Thus, Peter d’Ailly (Questiones super libros senteniarum [1490/1968], Q. 1, in Sec. 1, Art. 3, [pp. 4–10]) understands it; Canus, “De Locis Theologicis,” 2.8 in Opera [1605], pp. 41–53; Gerson, Driedo and Durandus refer it to the primitive and apostolic church, not to the present for whose authority it is here contended. See our “Disputatio Theologica de Scripturae Sacrae Authoritate” in Francisci Turrettini Opera (1848), 4:253–68.
Turretin, Francis. 1992–1997. Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Edited by James T. Dennison Jr. Translated by George Musgrave Giger. Vol. 1. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing.