Is the church infallible or can it err about faith? The former we deny; the latter we affirm against the Romanists
I. The question concerning the infallibility of the church is the most agitated of all which lie between us and Romanists about the church and of so great importance that the papacy seems to rest upon it as its principal fulcrum. For no other reason do they fight so sharply for the infallibility of the church than that they may attach this privilege to their own, which they hold to be the only true church. Thus they claim for it the supreme and unaccountable (anypeuthynon, i.e., “not liable to human criticism”) judgment in matters of faith, to which each and every person is bound to submit themselves without question (abasanistōs) and in blind obedience.
Statement of the question.
II. That the statement of the question, which is often inaccurately set forth, may be rightly obtained, we must remark: (1) that the question does not simply concern the invisible church of the elect or the universality of believers, whether it can err in the foundation (which our doctrine concerning the perseverance of the saints sufficiently proves is slanderously charged upon us), but whether it is to be said to be so infallible as to be exposed to no error (which we deny). (2) The question is not properly of the collective visible church of believers, but especially of the representative church of pastors; not indeed of the first who founded it (such as the apostles were, whom all confess were infallible), but of the subsequent, who preserved and ruled the church when founded. Nor does the question treat these separately considered (whom the opponents do not deny can err), but taken conjointly and gathered in council.
III. Bellarmine thus sets forth the received opinion among them. “Our opinion,” says he, “is that the church cannot absolutely err, neither in things absolutely necessary, nor in others which she proposes to us to be done or believed: And when we say the church cannot err, we understand this as much of the universality of believers, as of the universality of bishops, so that the sense of the proposition—‘the church cannot err’—is that which all believers are bound to believe is true and of faith and in like manner that which all bishops are bound to teach as pertaining to faith, is true and of faith” (“De Ecclesia Militante,” 3.14 Opera [1857], 2:98). Now although this privilege is here extended by Bellarmine to the universal multitude of believers, yet elsewhere (with little consistency) he restricts it to the bishops when he intends to prove that approved general councils cannot err. “Because,” says he, “the whole authority of the church is formally only in the prelates, as the vision of the whole body is formally only in the head; therefore it is the same thing that the church cannot err in defining matters of faith and that the bishops cannot err” (“De Conciliorum Auctoritate,” 2.2 Opera [1857], 2:43). However, if it is inquired whether this belongs to each and every bishop, in the same place he teaches that this is to be understood only of them congregated in a council “because the individuals separately can err.” Again, if anyone seeks whether this belongs absolutely and simply to the bishops congregated, he does not wish to acknowledge even this, unless the councils are approved by the pope. “All Catholics,” says he, “uniformly teach that general councils, confirmed by the supreme pontiff, cannot err” (ibid.). Hence it is gathered that the foundation of this infallibility is to be found in the pope alone, “on whose will it depends to sanction decrees and to change those sanctioned” (as Baronius says, Annales Ecclesiastici, Annus 373.21 [1866], 5:370). And thus under the name of church they understand the Roman pope, its head. In the meantime, that this infallibility of the pope is not to be understood absolutely, the same Bellarmine teaches when he says, “Catholics agree that the pope, even as pope, and with the assembly of counsellors, or with a general council, can err in controversies of fact, depending upon human information and testimony: and that the pope, as a private teacher, can also err in universal questions of right, both of faith and of practice and that too from ignorance, as sometimes happens to other teachers” (“De Romano Pontifice,” 4.2 Opera [1856], 1:477). But elsewhere, he says it is probable and can be piously believed that as a particular person the pope cannot be a heretic. He adds afterwards, “Catholics agree that the pope with a general council cannot err in establishing decrees of faith, or general precepts of practice; and that the pope, whether he can be a heretic or not, cannot in any way define anything heretical to be believed by the whole church” (ibid., 4.6, 1:484). “The supreme pontiff,” says he, “when he teaches the whole church, in things pertaining to faith, can in no case err” (ibid., 4.3, proposition 1, p. 478). Here he sufficiently betrays his own confusion (akatastasian). No less than Andrew Duval says, “Even if it is not of faith that the supreme pontiff, separated from the council, enjoys the privilege of infallibility, although he acts as pontiff” (which he solidly proves by various reasons) “still this is absolutely certain and indubitable” (De Suprema Romani Pontificis, Part 2, Q. 1.8 [1877], p. 105). But the Jesuits do not stop at this. They proceed further and extend the infallibility of the pope not only to questions of right, but also to questions of fact. This is evident from the Theses put forth at the College of Clermont in 1661, in which it is asserted, “Christ committed the government of his church so to popes as to grant to them the same infallibility which he himself had, as often as they would speak authoritatively” (cf. “Supplementum Secundi Tomi,” in Caroli D’Argentre, Collectio Judicorum de novis Erroribus [1736], 3:320–23). They thus conclude: “There is, therefore, in the church of Rome an infallible judge of controversies of faith even outside of a general Council, both in questions of right and of fact.” To this assertion, unheard of before in France, the Parisian Synod manfully opposed itself in its decree of January 22, 1663 (cf. A. G. Martimont, Le gallicanisme de Bossuet [1953], pp. 216–36, esp. p. 235).
IV. Still we must confess that all Romanists do not hold the same opinion on this subject. For as not a few think the church can err in things not revealed (as Cano, “De Locis theologicis,” 4.4 Opera [1605], pp. 195–205), either in things not pertaining to faith; or which are of fact, not of right (as Alphonsus a Castro, Adversus omnes haereses 6 [1556], pp. 156–201), so as to the pope there are many distinguished men among them (and even councils themselves) by whom this infallibility is not approved—nay, by whom it is openly denied. Bellarmine acknowledges this while he gives the opinion of those who hold that “the pope, as pope, can be a heretic, and teach heresy, if he defines without a general council, and that sometimes this has actually happened” (“De Romano Pontifice,” 4.2 Opera [1856], 1:477). He ascribes this opinion to Nilus (A Briefe Treatise Concerning … the Popes Usurped Primacye [1560], pp. 9–14), Gerson, Almayno, Adrian VI and the Parisians, who place infallibility of judgment concerning matters of faith not in the pope, but in the church, or in a general council. The fathers of the Council of Basil confess that “they had often found and read that the pope erred” (“Epistolae et Responsiones Synodales, III,” Mansi 29:249). The Gloss says, “The pope is to be judged by no one, unless he is found to have strayed from the faith” (“Decreti,” Pt. I, Dist. 40.6, Corpus Iuris Canonici [1959], 1:146). Now why should such a restriction be employed if this was impossible? The same opinion was held by Peter d’Ailly, Cardinal of Cambrai (de Auth. Eccles. p. 3, cap. 3+); Nicholas of Cusa (“De Concordantia Catholica,” 1.15 Opera Omnia [1939], 14:79–81) and commonly by the French church and the Sorbonne—expressly in the censure exhibited to the king in the year 1663 of the proposition of Amadeus Guimenius and Vernantius, where the infallibility of the pope was defended. In the sixth proposition, the faculty says, “It is not a dogma, nor doctrine of the faculty, that the chief pontiff, no consent of the church being added, is infallible” (cf. A.G. Martimort, Le gallicanisme de Bossuet [1953], p. 235). This the assembly of French clergy had confirmed two years before, decreeing among various things this also in their fourth proposition: “The pope has the principal authority in matters of faith; but his decisions are not certain without the consent of the church.”
V. Thus the Romanists among themselves are split into various parties about this infallibility of the church. The opinion of the orthodox returns to this: (1) the invisible catholic church, however it can be said to be infallible objectively, inasmuch as it cannot commit deadly error in the foundation, so as absolutely to cease to be (as was proved above), still while it wars on earth, it is always exposed to various errors no less than sins. (2) The visible church, which is collected in particular assemblies through the whole world, whether it is regarded collectively or representatively in its rulers; either considered by individuals apart or all joined together in a council, is not infallible, but is liable to deadly error as well in faith as in practice, in questions of right as well as in questions of fact. The privilege of freedom from error (anamartēsias) was not given nor does it any longer belong to any church or person after the apostolic time.
That the church is not infallible is proved: (1) from the imperfection of regeneration.
VI. The reasons are various. The first is drawn from the imperfection of regeneration. Infallibility supposes a perfect knowledge of things and excludes all ignorance, which is the mother of error. And yet to no church or believer does this perfection belong, as long as they are upon earth. Nay, in this the church triumphant differs from the militant, that the former (seeing God face to face) is absolutely perfect and, as to knowledge and holiness, free from all error and stain. The latter, because it bears about with it the remains of sin and only beholds in a mirror and darkly, is still exposed to both: “For we know in part and prophesy in part” (1 Cor. 13:9); “And we walk by faith, not by sight” (2 Cor. 5:7). Therefore, as there is no one who does not sin, so there is no one who does not err or who cannot err. “Who can understand his errors? Cleanse thou me from secret faults” (Ps. 19:12*).
2. From the nature of the promises given to the church.
VII. (2) From the nature of the promises given to the church, which always include the tacit or expressed condition of perseverance in the faith: “If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed” (Jn. 8:31); “He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me: and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him” (Jn. 14:21); “If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him” (v. 23). Thus to the church at Rome the kindness of God is promised, provided she continues in it; otherwise excision is threatened: “Behold therefore the goodness and severity of God: on them which fell, severity; but toward thee, goodness, if thou continue in his goodness: otherwise thou also shalt be cut off” (Rom. 11:22). Therefore, as these promises are conditional, they cannot have a place unless the condition is fulfilled and since this is wanting in various cases, this privilege also must necessarily cease. I confess that in the elect God works the condition itself, so that they may be free at least from fundamental error. But in this respect it cannot be said of others.
3. From the hypothesis of our opponents.
VIII. (3) From the hypothesis of our opponents. The church, according to Romanists, consists not only of true believers, but also of unbelievers and reprobates, who can be destitute of all internal virtues, faith, hope and love (as Bellarmine owns, “De Ecclesia Militante,” 3.2 Opera [1857], 2:74–75) and, as was seen before, to whom no one would say the privilege of infallibility is granted. In vain, then, does he add in the same place that he believes all virtues are found in the church, because he expressly acknowledges that this does not necessarily belong to it.
4. From the fallibility of individuals.
IX. (4) From the fallibility of individuals. Individual pastors and rulers of churches are fallible, as our opponents confess; therefore also the whole. For what individuals apart from each other do not possess, they cannot have when gathered together; nor can an assembly or council, which is composed of fallible members, be infallible. Nor does the presence of Christ make them more infallible than two or three believers, who are gathered together in the name of Christ, in the midst of whom Christ promises that he will be.
5. From the silence of Scripture.
X. (5) From the silence of Scripture. For if the church ought to be infallible, the Holy Spirit would undoubtedly somewhere have told believers of it, as of a thing of the greatest importance to confirm the faith of the pious and to guard them against all seductions. Otherwise he would appear to have been wanting in a thing the most necessary of all and which it was of the greatest moment for the church to know. But nowhere is mention made of this privilege having been given to any certain church; for it will be shown hereafter that the many passages adduced by our opponents to prove this thing do not prove it. So far from its being said that this was granted to the Roman church (as ought to have been said by all means, if any such thing belonged to it), on the contrary Paul earnestly admonishes it of the danger of defection and of their impending fall: “Because of unbelief they were broken off, and thou standest by faith. Be not highminded, but fear: For if God spared not the natural branches, take heed lest he also spare not thee” (Rom. 11:20, 21*). Now why should the apostle have said this if he believed the gift of infallibility had been bestowed upon it? And he urges them “to mark them which cause divisions and offenses contrary to the doctrine which they had learned; and avoid them” (Rom. 16:17). And he who compares the Roman church of today with the primitive will easily perceive the propriety of this premonition.
6. From the experience of all ages.
XI. (6) From the experience of all ages. It is evident that the church often erred under the Old Testament. The Israelite church erred when Aaron made the golden calf and built an altar before it (Ex. 32:2, 5). Now it makes little difference whether this was done by the well-ordered judgment of the church or by a tumultuary concourse of people, provided it appears that the rulers of the church themselves with the people fell into such a sin. Nor does it relieve the matter whether for a long time or for a little while they remained in that sin. It is sufficient that such a crime was committed in order to prove that the church was not infallible. And although Aaron had not as yet been consecrated a priest in solemn manner, still that he had been already designated and determined upon by God and acknowledged by the people is evident even from the fact that the priests are ordered to sanctify themselves (Ex. 19:22) and that the people came to him to make the calf (which they would not have done unless they now regarded him as a priest). What is said of the Levites (that they did not recognize father or brother in taking vengeance on idolators, Ex. 32:26; Dt. 33:9) shows that there might have been found many among the Levites who had not polluted themselves with this crime or who at once recognized the sin committed and endeavored in this way to wash it off; but it does not prove that the tribe of Levi was absolutely free from it since Aaron, the head of the Levites, was the author of that sin.
XII. The Israelite church erred under the judges, when after the death of Joshua they deserted the Lord and served Baal. The magnitude of this corruption is graphically described in Jdg. 2. She erred under the impious and idolatrous kings of Samaria as well as of Jerusalem in the times of Joram, Ahaziah, Manasseh, Ahab and others, under whom the people lapsed into foul idolatry, the temple of God was often shut and public worship was neglected and miserably corrupted. And that no one may say that the prophets, priests and the greater and more reputable part of the people were not infected in the same manner, the utterances of the prophets should be consulted, from which it is evident that the leaders of the church and the priests and prophets were not free from it. Isaiah bitterly inveighs against the priests and shepherds of the people because they were drunk, blind and held by the spirit of deep sleep (Is. 29:9*, 10; 42:19); because they were blind and deaf (Is. 56:10, 11), dumb dogs, all blind watchmen, who sleep and love to slumber and cannot understand. Jeremiah rebukes them for falsehood and lying, idolatry and avarice, perfidy and defection from God (Jer. 2:8; 5:30, 31; 6:13; 8:8–10; 10:21; 23:27, 28; 50:6). Ezekiel warns them because they did violence to the law, did not distinguish between the sacred and profane and polluted the sanctuary (Ezk. 7:26; 22:26). And so everywhere with the others. Nor can the difference between the church of the Old Testament and the church of the New be brought forward here. Bellarmine confesses that “the Jewish priests had the privilege of not erring, until Christ should come” (“De Ecclesia Militante,” 3.17 Opera [1857], 2:104). No better is it said that the prophetic words are figurative, directed indeed to all, but still not to be understood of all, but only of many. Although God has always preserved for himself a remnant of grace in the most corrupt state (Is. 1:9), still it clearly appears that the multitude of priests, who arrogated to themselves the title of church, shamefully erred. Nor is it to be added that this is not said of the council of priests, but of the pastors and prophets who separately deceived the people. For they who were such separately, when joined ought not to be any better. Besides, the Holy Spirit speaks not of one or another separately, but of the whole order and the entire college of priests: “The priests shall be astonished, and the prophets shall wonder” (Jer. 4:9); “The law shall perish from the priest, and counsel from the ancients” (Ezk. 7:26); “Night shall be unto you, that ye shall not have a vision; and it shall be dark unto you, that ye shall not divine; and the sun shall go down over the prophets” (Mic. 3:6); “As troops of robbers wait for a man, so the company of priests murder in the way by consent” (Hos. 6:9). Finally, the example of the four hundred false prophets opposed to Micaiah (1 K. 22), proves that not one or another, but the company (collegium) itself erred. Nor were these the prophets of Baal (because Micaiah does not rebuke them), but the prophets of Jehovah, who boasted of that name, though falsely. Hence Jehoshaphat asks, “Is there not here a prophet of the Lord besides (’vdh)” (v. 7), as Cajetan properly observes (“In Libros Regum Commentarii,” Quotquot in Sacrae Scripturae [1639], 2:223 on 1 [3] K. 22:7).
XIII. The synagogue grievously erred in the time of Christ, making void the commandment of God by their traditions (Mt. 15:3*), twisting the law by their corruptions (Mt. 5), tainting the purer doctrine with the deadly leaven of various errors and striking upon a stone of offense. Not the few and ignoble, but the chiefs of the people, priests and scribes, pastors who held the succession of places and person, not only separately, but collectively in council. Here they not only decreed excommunication (aposynagōgos) to the followers of Christ (Jn. 9:34), but the condemnation and death of Christ also (Jn. 11*:50; Mt. 26:65, 66), as an impostor and false Messiah. Now since no one can deny that this was the greatest of all crimes, they must also confess that the synagogue, in relation to which the church of that time was visible, most basely erred.
XIV. Vain are the refuges sought by Romanists to escape the force of this argument which presses them. (1) “Caiaphas did not err in this oracle” when he said that it was expedient for one man to die for the people, because he is said by John “to have prophesied” (i.e., he uttered it in a prophetic spirit, which was done to the execution of the divine decree). But who can hear this without horror? As if the Devil and the wicked do not sin when God uses them (although contrary to their intention) to execute his counsel. Or if he is said to have prophesied in thus speaking, on that account he did not err. For he did not do it willingly and knowingly, but from the counsel of the Holy Spirit, who wished such words to be uttered by him as would open this purpose of God, although beyond his mind. (2) “He erred in mind, not in words.” But Bellarmine refutes this from Mt. 26:65, where Caiaphas says of Christ, “He hath spoken blasphemy: what further need have we of witnesses?” “For then, surely,” says he, “he did not prophesy, but blasphemed” (“De Conciliorum Auctoritate,” 2.8 Opera [1857], 2:49). Besides, when the question is Can councils err? the dispute is not about the words, but the meaning of the council. For laws consist not in the words, but in the sense; nor can they be said to be obedient to councils who, tenacious of the words, despise the opinion and the intention. (3) “He erred in fact, not in right, not by condemning the Messiah, but him whom they believed used the name of Messiah falsely.” But this also is well refuted by Bellarmine because this very thing pertains to right and refers to the most momentous dogma of all concerning the true Messiah. The ignorance of fact is then an ignorance of right when there is no reason for doubting the fact; otherwise the Jews of our day would have to be excused who, blaspheming Christ, think they do not deny the true, but a false Messiah. (4) “This was not a lawful council.” But although it was not lawful intrinsically (because they were not assembled in the name of God, nor proposed the glory of God to themselves, but their own depraved affections), still it could not be called unlawful extrinsically because there was nothing wanting to the constitution of a council extrinsically lawful: the head presided, its members lawfully called together were present, and, the matter having often before been called up in the council, a decree was passed. (5) “It erred indeed, but, Christ being present, the privilege of not erring had ceased, nor, while Christ lived on earth, whose authority was supreme and absolutely infallible, was there need that the council could not err; nay, it was predicted that it would err.” But (a) either that privilege ceased at the advent of Christ in the flesh or only at his death. If the former, why did Christ so often send persons to the priests? Why did he command those sitting in the seat of Moses to be heard? Why did he frequent the temple and attend the sacred rites performed by them? If the latter, as Lombard maintains, “In the death of Christ only were all legal things terminated” (Sententiarum, IV*, Dist. 3.10 [PL 192/2.845]). Therefore the office and privileges of the priests (which they pursued) still remained, nor ought they to have erred. (b) If the fall of the synagogue was predicted, so also was the fall of the Christian church. If it could happen that while Christ was living and speaking on earth, the church so disgracefully erred, what hinders this also from being the case today, Christ being now absent and received into heaven and speaking only in the Scriptures?
7. From predictions.
XV. (7) From the various predictions, from which it is evident that the church of the New Testament should err. In 2 Thess. 2, Paul (speaking of the apostasy of the last days) says, “The day of the Lord shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition; who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, shewing himself that he is God” (vv. 3, 4). Here there are as many weighty arguments as there are words. Mention is made of “an apostasy” which was to come (namely from faith) by “the man of sin and the son of perdition,” i.e., a remarkable apostate who should be the author of this so great defection, both most wicked in himself and the author of the sin and error of others and thus devoted to eternal perdition and destruction; who boasts himself as lawless (hanomon) and not amenable to law (to wit, free from all laws); who is to be judged by no one and who arrogates to himself the authority of judging all; who should “sit” (i.e., exercise authority and dominion) “in the temple of God” or the church “as if he was God,” lording it over the conscience, “exalting himself above God” (to wit, opposing his authority to that of God, prohibiting what he has permitted and permitting what he has prohibited) and “above all that is called God” (namely, above kings and princes, who are often so designated in the Scriptures, while he demands from them worship, submission and service). Now if such and so great an apostasy was to have place in the church, who would say that the gift of infallibility belongs to it?
XVI. By this apostasy cannot be meant (1) political defection from the Roman Empire, instead of a spiritual and ecclesiastical defection from the faith of Christ. Neither the words nor the adjuncts by which it is described allow this. Not the words because as often as the Scripture of the New Testament uses the word apostasias or the verb aphistēmi, it denotes a defection from the faith (Acts 21:21; 1 Tim. 4:1). Not the adjuncts because it treats of a defection which is connected with miracles of lying and all the seduction of iniquity (2 Thess. 2:9, 10), which the mystery of iniquity works (v. 7), which exerts itself by the efficacy of error, that they who are unwilling to believe the truth may believe a lie (v. 11). Hence it is elsewhere described by defection from the faith, by attention given to seducing spirits and the doctrines of devils and by spiritual fornication and adultery (Rev. 17:2, 4); or idolatry, by which the bond of God’s marriage with the church is sundered. (2) Nor is a defection to Mohammedanism meant. The sitting in the temple of God does not agree with Mohammed; nor did the Turkish domination rage so much by fraud as by force; nor did it attack the conscience so much as the body; nor do we read of its using such lying signs or tricks in order to instill its poison. It is one thing to compel with the sword as a tyrant; another to hinder with the keys as the false bishop. One thing with the open mouth of the dragon to gape at the prey; another under the lamb’s skin and with the horns of the dragon to belch out blasphemies. Finally, Paul speaks of such a mystery as had even begun then and whose eruption and open revelation delayed the Roman Empire (which the apostle understands by “withholding” [ton katechonta]), which cannot be said of Mohammedanism. (3) Nor is the defection to Gentilism meant. It is such a mystery as the revelation of something stood in the way of. Now nothing stood in the way of Gentilism at that time; nay, all things appeared to return to it (nor ought that to be called a mystery which external force or the enticements of the flesh were openly recommending). Besides, it could not have been said that the son of perdition was still to be revealed, because Gentilism was already sufficiently manifested and prevailed among almost all nations. Finally, it is said to be about to sit in the temple of God, which does not apply to the Gentiles. Hence it is evident that this apostasy can refer to nothing else than the general defection which should arise in the Christian church by the advent of Antichrist. This has elsewhere been more fully proved in our Disputation 7, “De Secessione ab Ecclesia Romana” (Opera [1858], 4:147–77), where the figment of Grotius concerning Caligula and Simon Magus is refuted, and many more things are to be found on this subject.
XVII. Here belong the many other predictions concerning the corruptions and errors that were to be introduced into the church by false christs and seducing spirits in the last times, which believers are commanded to avoid: “Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves” (Mt. 7:15); “There shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect” (Mt. 24:24); “Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost has made you overseers … because after my departing shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock … men speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them” (Acts 20:28–30*); “The Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils” (1 Tim. 4:1); “There shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies” (2 Pet. 2:1); “Little children, it is the last time: and as ye have heard that antichrist shall come, even now are there many antichrists” (1 Jn. 2:18). Note especially the book of Revelation, where the great Babylonian harlot and the mother of fornications is said to intoxicate the kings of the earth and the inhabitants of the world with the wine of fornication (i.e., idolatry, chaps. 17 and 18). On this account, God calls his people out from her, lest sharing in her sins they may also partake of her destruction. Since from all these it appears that deadly errors were to have a place in the church, everyone sees that infallibility cannot be predicated truly of her.
8. From an examination of doctrine.
XVIII. (8) From an examination of the doctrine imposed upon believers. They are recalled to the “law and testimony” (Is. 8:20), i.e., to the law which contains the testimony of the divine will towards us, which alone they ought to consult (magicians and soothsayers being despised), so that whatever is handed down by them should be brought to this standard. Elsewhere they are commanded “to search the Scriptures” (Jn. 5:39); “to try the spirits whether they are of God” (1 Jn. 4:1), i.e., by the touchstone of the Scripture, not only by the public judgment of the church, but also by private judgment, which belongs to all the pious that they may establish their faith from the word of God. In this manner, Paul wishes believers “to prove all things” (1 Thess. 5:21), i.e., all the doctrines proposed to them, according to the polestar of the word and the analogy of faith and “to hold fast what is good” (i.e., the sound doctrine—error and falsehood being rejected). The same apostle elsewhere orders the Corinthians to judge concerning what he spoke (1 Cor. 10:15), namely, by comparing it with the Scriptures, whether these things were so (after the example of the Bereans, Acts 17:11). On this account, he testifies “that by manifestation of the truth, he commends himself to every man’s conscience” (2 Cor. 4:2), which could not be done without examination. Now why should this examination and judgment be enjoined upon believers so earnestly, if infallibility had been given to the church? Would it not have been sufficient to put believers in mind of this privilege that by absolute submission and without examination they should receive whatever was delivered to them by the church? And since this is nowhere done (nay, on the contrary each one is ordered to live by his faith), it hence clearly appears that the comment of infallibility is obtruded falsely and without foundation.
9. From the uncertainty of this doctrine among the Romanists.
XIX. (9) From the uncertainty of this doctrine among the Romanists themselves. They are not yet agreed among themselves on the seat of this infallibility, nor is it known as yet with whom it ought to be—with the pope or with a council. Some claim this privilege for a council, as is done by all those who believe the pope to be fallible and who on that account wish the council to be above him (as it was decreed in the councils of Constance and Basil and is constantly believed by the French church). Others ascribe it to the pope, as those who maintain that he is superior to a council (as the Council of Trent determined and with it the canonists and Scholastics). Again, although it should be evident with whom such infallibility exists, no less would the faith in this mystery shake, because on their hypothesis concerning the necessary intention of the minister to the essence of a sacrament, it can appear by no certain argument either that this council is an ecumenical council lawfully assembled and consisting of fit members, or that the man who sits in Rome is the true pope, in whose infallibility our faith ought to be resolved. For according to them, it is not of faith that this pope numerically seated today is the lawful successor of Peter and the vicar of Christ, much less that those who are gathered in council are lawful bishops, properly baptized and ordained. How then can they be certain of their own infalliblity or demand from others that certainty which they cannot even themselves have? Thus all things waver and remain uncertain among them because the last resolution of faith is not made in the divinely inspired (theopneuston) Scripture alone, but in the worthless comment of the infallibility of the church (about whose certain seat they disagree among themselves and which it is most certain cannot be found either in the council or in the pope).
XX. For as to the council, besides the fact that many of the Romanists maintain that even general councils are exposed to error (hence they distribute them into reprobated, approved and mixed) and that they suspend their infallibility upon the confirmation of the pope, it is certain that freedom from error (anamartēsian) can no more belong to all the members of a council conjointly than to individual pastors separately (who are believed to be fallible by themselves). Nor is any promise of infallibility given to a council rather than to private persons. Besides it is known that various councils erred, as the Ariminsian (Rimini) and Seleucian under Constantius II, which confirmed Arianism (cf. Hefele, 2:246–71); the Ephesian (second piratical [lēstrikon]) under Theodosius the Younger (II), in which the Eutychian heresy was approved (cf. Hefele, 3:221–62); and not a few others. This is not obscurely confirmed from the dissonance and contrariety of the councils which passed discordant decrees. The Roman under Stephen (VI) rescinded the acts of the Formosan, and the Roman under John IX set aside the acts of Stephen and restored the Formosan. The second Nicene introduced images; Constantinople and Frankfort ejected them. The synods of Constance and Basil subject the pope to the council, but the Lateran and Tridentine reverse it. The Constantian took the cup from the people; the Basilian restored it under certain conditions. But what was the spirit in the latter councils (which the Romanists use most) can appear even to a blind man, from the acts of the second Nicene and the Constantian councils: the former sacrilegiously treads underfoot the second commandment of the decalogue, while the latter treads underfoot the precept of Christ concerning receiving entirely the supper instituted by himself.
XXI. Many things prove that the popes also are not infallible. (1) The faith of history, from which it is evident that many of them were not only most abandoned, magicians, simonians, poisoners, atheists and given to every kind of vice, such as were those whom Baronius investigates (as if so many monsters had thrust themselves into that seat); cf. Baronius, Annales Ecclesiastici, Annus 900 [1868], 15:467–78; and Genebrard, when he says “that through almost 150 years about fifty Popes from John VIII, namely, until Leo IX, wholly failed, apostactic or apostate, rather than apostolical” (Chronographiae 4 [1580], p. 318). Rather they also fell into heresy: as Liberius subscribing to Arianism; Honorius I subscribing to Monothelitism and on that account condemned in the general Council VI (Constantinople III, a.d. 680–681), Act 13 (cf. Hefele, 5:167); Marcellinus I sacrificing to idols; Zosimus favoring Pelagianism; John XIII denying the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body, condemned in the Council of Constance; Gregory VII and Boniface VIII claiming for themselves supreme power over kings and princes; and very many others of whom even Romanist historians speak. (2) The Romanists themselves did not believe that infallibility, who so often rescinded the acts of their own predecessors and passed various contradictory decrees about many articles of faith, in which the latter recede from the decrees and opinions of the former, which they would assuredly not have done if they had believed this privilege of infallibility residing in that seat. (3) Many councils exercised their power over popes, deposing them on account of heresies and crimes and pronouncing them heretics. (4) The appeals to a future council, often made against the wishes of popes and the Roman Curia, testify the same thing. (5) There would have been no need to call together with so much trouble councils to give an opinion of doubtful authority, if an infallible judgment could have been found in the pope. For to no purpose is that done by more which can be done more fitly and certainly by fewer. Finally (not to heap up any more reasons which could be adduced), if the pope were infallible, he would himself be the principle and norm of believing; and dying, the infallibility of the church would fail.
XXII. Nor do their ridiculous little distinctions help the Romanists at all, by which they endeavor to deceive the more simple and to encrust in some way this absurd comment, while they maintain: (1) “The pope indeed as a private teacher can err, but not as a pope speaking authoritatively” (ex cathedra). For although sometimes the same private person can put on a public character (schesin) as consul and a private character as the father of a family, according to his twofold state and office, there can be no room in this argument for such an abstraction because it is treated everywhere of the same office of teacher and of the same doctrine to be taught. Now how can it happen that as pope, he can determine and judge contrary to what he himself thinks as a private person? Can sweet and bitter flow out of the same mouth? Thus the same one as pope will be orthodox, while as a private person he will be a heretic. The same man as an infallible pope could be acquitted and saved in the judgment of God and as an erring private man be condemned in the same judgment. Why then does this man not consult for himself that he may cease to err and not perish? Again, since it is not as yet evident what that seat is, how can it be evident and by what marks may it be discerned when he speaks ex cathedra, when not? Nay, since the pope from the very moment of his election and inauguration is considered as occupying that sacred seat of Peter, there can be no moment of time in which he can be sought or conceived to be out of it and so in which he can act or determine anything out of the seat which is liable to error. And if God had willed the pope to be infallible for the salvation of the church, would he not have provided that he should determine nothing erroneously by private and personal act, no less than by public and judicial act?
XXIII. (2) “He can err in questions of fact, not of right.” But first, the Jesuits, who ascribe both kinds of infallibility to him, do not admit this. And although this opinion draws after it various most gross absurdities (as the censors of the Clermont Thesis observe), still they all fall back upon it (who defend the infallibility of the pope in controversies of right) because the question of fact is often resolved into a question of right: for example, he who can err in a fact, could err in the application of passages of Scripture to the controverted heads of faith. This necessarily involves the question of right. Thus he who can err in fact can also doubt concerning the creation of the world, the advent of Christ into the world and his resurrection, all of which draw after them most momentous questions of right. (3) “He can err in those things which pertain to morals, but not in those which are of faith.” But Bellarmine holds the contrary. “The pope,” says he, “cannot err not only in decrees of faith, but neither in precepts of morals, which are prescribed to the whole church” (“De Romano Pontifice,” 4.5 Opera [1856], 1:483). Again, he cannot err contrary to good morals by determining something from the plenitude of his power which in itself is unjust and unlawful without being bound by this most grievous error in the faith—that this belongs to him of right. Finally, if there is granted the perpetual assistance of the Holy Spirit to furnish infallibility to the pope in matters of faith, why could he not have the same in those things which pertain to morals? Nor does the distinction into dogmatic and practical infallibility avail, as if the former may well be ascribed to him and not the latter, according to the example of Peter, who, infallible in faith, yet sinned in morals. It is not treated here of the sinlessness of men in the action of life (which we do not read of having been granted to anyone, not even to the apostles), but of the public exercise of office, concerning the making of dogmas of faith and precepts of morals, about which the distinction of dogmatic and practical infallibility cannot have a place.
Sources of explanation.
XXIV. The church, which is governed by Christ and the Holy Spirit only and always, does not err; but the church militant neither only nor always is so governed by the Holy Spirit because it is not rarely governed also by the flesh, which lusts against the Spirit (Gal. 5:17). Nor on this account is the error or infirmity of the church or of its particular members to be ascribed to Christ and the Holy Spirit (quickening this mystical body and each of its members) anymore than a dislocation of the foot or of the hand is ascribed to the soul, informing the natural body and its individual members. So that here that expression of Augustine ought always to obtain: God so administers all the things he created as to permit them also to exercise their own motions (CG 7.30 [FC 8:387–88; PL 41.220]). Hence not the same perfection is to be looked for in the church as in the primary teacher of the truth (who is the Holy Spirit thus acting in the church according as its capacity and measure bears, no more wiping away from it all pollution than all tears).
XXV. Although Christ is the spouse of the church, it does not immediately follow that she ought to be infallible; or if he wills to preserve her from all fundamental error that she may not err totally; and finally, it does not follow that he has determined to remove all error from her. On the contrary, he wishes to try her faith repeatedly by permitting her sometimes to fall into errors. Nor if at times sleeping, the church does not hear her spouse’s voice, does she on that account wholly desert or repudiate him, as he who passes by with deaf ear the dictation of conscience in any action has not immediately rejected reason itself. As he does not become an unbeliever at once who weakens the doctrine of faith by any reason whatsoever, but he only who overturns the foundation and does not retain the head (Col. 2:19). For as a carnal marriage is not destroyed by any disagreement whatsoever, so the bond of spiritual wedlock is sundered not by any error or any heresy. And although idolatry, which is spiritual adultery, furnishes the most just cause of a divorce, still God by his long-continued patience and clemency recalls his bride to better fruit before he repudiates her.
XXVI. Although there is in the church a perpetual standard and the most certain rule of doctrine, admitting no stain of error in itself, it does not follow that the church is absolutely infallible. The church, which creeps in the mire, does not altogether receive that accuracy (akribeian); nor can anyone affirm this, except him who confounds the beginning with the end, the starting place with the goal. And thus the church (by which he believes the doctrine of the divine word) is free from a fall, but the church (by which he believes imperfectly and is surrounded by the wind of human doctrine) errs.
XXVII. It is one thing for Christ to be always present with the invisible church of the elect, to preserve it from fundamental error and from a total and final fall; another to be present with the visible church (and in particular with the representative) to provide infallibility to it in all its decrees. Christ promises the former (Is. 59:21; Mt. 16:18; 28:20; Jn. 14:16), but not the latter because these promises are not fulfilled in others than true believers and the elect (in the number of whom are all those who compose ecclesiastical assemblies) can be discovered by no one; nay, from various examples it is evident that the number of the wicked and worldly often prevails in them.
XXVIII. When Christ promises the presence of the Spirit (who would lead them into all truth, Jn. 16:13) to his disciples, he primarily and absolutely refers to the apostles who, as founders of the church and institutors of the canon of faith, ought to be infallible (as Toletus, Jansen and others of the Romanists acknowledge). Secondarily, it is certainly extended to ordinary pastors and to particular believers, but not in the same degree and measure of gifts; otherwise all would be equally infallible. Therefore the influence of the Holy Spirit is not to be understood absolutely and simply as to all truth universally, but with a limitation and relatively with respect to the subject matter (i.e., truth necessary to salvation, as Carthusianus observes; cf. ?“Enarratio in epistolae I B. Pauli ad Corinthos,” Opera omnia [1901], v. 13 on 1 Cor. 1:5) in the same manner as the Corinthians are said “to be enriched in all utterance” (1 Cor. 1:5) and Paul is said “to have declared all the counsel of God” (Acts 20:27). Ministers are led into all truth by the Spirit of God speaking in the Scriptures and so long are they directed by the Spirit as they hear the word proposed by him and do not swerve from this rule; but no one would dare to say that they never will turn out of this course (Paul testifying the contrary [Acts 20:29, 30], as well as the experience of all ages). Otherwise the Spirit is promised to each one of the apostles separately, so it would belong to each pastor separately, which our opponents do not hold. This promise then, given by Christ first to the apostles, is indeed well said to be extended to their successors, but in a lower degree which can belong to ordinary ministers, not as to the apostolic preeminence (hyperochēn) of infallibility which was peculiar to them. Again, it refers only to the genuine successors of the apostles, who are no other than they who retain their doctrine.
XXIX. When the church is said by Paul “to be the pillar and ground of the truth” (1 Tim. 3:15), (1) it denotes indeed her office and function in proposing, holding, vindicating and defending the truth, but not her immutable privilege—what she is bound to do and not what she always does; just as “the priest’s lips,” are said “to keep knowledge, and to seek the law at his mouth: for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts” (Mal. 2:7). Not that this is always done by him (since it is immediately added in the following verse, “But ye are departed out of the way; ye have caused many to stumble at the law”), but because this duty was imposed upon him. Thus often the words which signify an action are to be understood of a duty (Ezk. 34:2; Mal. 1:6). (2) It is treated here of the Ephesian church in particular, in which Timothy, its bishop, was to be employed, to which Rome is unwilling to ascribe infallibility. (3) This is said of the church collectively in contradistinction to the pastors and not of the representative, about which the question is properly moved by them. See more on the meaning of this passage Volume I, Topic II, Of Scripture, Question 6, Section 25.
XXX. What is said only conditionally is not to be understood absolutely: “He that receiveth you receiveth me” (Mt. 10:40); “He that heareth you heareth me” (Lk. 10:16) (to wit, if you hear me and propose nothing but my word, delivering nothing else than what you received from me, nor speaking anything else than what I have taught you [Ezk. 3:17; 1 Cor. 11:23], which the thing itself cries out is not always done by pastors). Otherwise if they propose figments of their own genius and the doctrines of men, so far from their being listened to, they ought to be rejected and considered as under the curse (Gal. 1:8). Thus the scribes and Pharisees sitting in the seat of Moses are commanded to be heard (Mt. 23*:2, 3) (i.e., as long as and insofar as they sit in it, to wit, by retaining and delivering the doctrine of Moses, since nevertheless elsewhere he had commanded the pious to keep themselves away from their leaven, that is, their false doctrine, Mt. 16:6, 12).
XXXI. (1) On this account, the church is not the more to be considered infallible when it is ordered to be heard (Mt. 18:17), or those bearing rule when we are commanded to obey them (Heb. 13:17), than either any ordinary judge to whom obedience in like manner is to be rendered (Dt. 17:12) or any parent to whom we are religiously bound to listen according to the prescription of Solomon (Prov. 6:20, 21). Therefore this expression means only that authority should be respected in those who are in public office, but always under this condition—that they prescribe nothing base, for then they should be resisted. So it is false that we are absolutely bound under the penalty of a curse to believe whatever the church teaches. For as Christ enjoined upon pastors to teach what he himself committed to them (Mt. 28:20), thus he enjoins upon believers to believe the same things and no other. This is so certain that Paul did not hesitate to denounce an anathema upon the one preaching another gospel (Gal. 1:8). (2) It is treated in the same place of the eldership of each particular church, to whom, however, no one has dared to ascribe infallibility, and concerning the exercise of discipline, not concerning doctrines of faith. Nor ought the severe punishment which is denounced against one unwilling to hear (“Let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican”) to be urged because severe punishments are also denounced against those who do not obey a magistrate and parents, who nevertheless no one would say are infallible. Thus the anathemas which councils hurl upon heresies, which they condemn from the Scriptures, no more prove their infallibility than the solemn denunciations of the divine wrath against sins pronounced by individual pastors prove them to be infallible. Here belongs that expression of the Master of Sentences (Lombard): “God does not always follow the judgment of the church, which sometimes judges dishonestly and ignorantly, but God always judges according to the truth” (Sententiarum, IV, Dist. 18*.6 [PL 192/2.887]).
XXXII. Although infallibility is not given by God to the church, it cannot on this account be said that God was wanting in things necessary to her, because it is not necessary to have a supreme and infallible tribunal among men upon whose decrees and responses our faith should be suspended, since it is sufficient for her to have an infallible rule of faith and practice in the Scriptures, which as long as she observes, she will not wander from the right track.
XXXIII. From the fact that Christ promises to be in the midst of two or three gathered together in his name (Mt. 18:19, 20), it is well inferred that to any pious pastors and believers assembling in his name (i.e., from his call and his name being invoked that they may seek his glory and promote his cause and with the purpose of following his command), he will give so much of grace and help as will be necessary to them in accordance with their condition and their call. But improperly would anyone infer either that all who are congregated assemble in the name of Christ in this manner or that to those who rightly come together absolute infallibility is granted, because they do not need it in their call. Thus they ought not to be a rule of faith because that belongs to the Scriptures alone, to which all things are to be referred; otherwise the same privilege would belong to any of the laity assembling in the name of Christ.
XXXIV. The infallibility of the church having been denied, it does not follow (as the Bishop of Meaux [Meldensis] maintains in his conference with the celebrated Claudius [of Turin]) that any private person, although ignorant, is bound to believe that he can more rightly understand the word of God than whole synods and the entire true church; nor is this believed or said by us. Rather we hold only that private believers gifted with the Holy Spirit are bound to examine, according to the word of God, whatever is proposed for their belief or practice by the rulers of the church; as much by individuals separately as by many congregated in a synod. Also they are to believe that by the guidance of the Spirit, by pious prayers and diligent study of the Scriptures, they can better find out the meaning of Scripture in things necessary to salvation than whole synods receding from the word of God and than a society which claims for itself (but falsely) the name of the true church. Therefore, the examination which they are bound to make is not made for the purpose of correcting the meaning of the true church and of finding out a better (as if they were wiser), but to investigate and follow it. Nor is the right of examination founded in this—that we ought to believe ourselves wiser and more sagacious than entire synods and the whole true church; but in this—that since the privilege of infallibility has been granted by God to no church or pastor, nor are we certain whether they who compose ecclesiastical assemblies are members of the true church and faithful servants of God, who are partakers of the Holy Spirit and follow his guidance; nay, it can happen (and it has too often happened) that such assemblies have erred in their decisions. Hence no other means is left for the believer to know the legitimate authority of these assemblies and the decisions made by them with the certainty of faith, than a comparison and examination of them with the word of God, which he not only permits as possible and lawful, but commands as just and necessary. That cannot, therefore, be considered rashness or pride which belongs to the execution of an indispensable office imposed upon all believers. Nor under the pretext of avoiding pride ought believers to blind themselves and to divest themselves of their right in order that their consciences by a blind obedience may be reduced to bondage.
XXXV. It is not absurd that believers piously and in the fear of the Lord searching the Scriptures can better ascertain their meaning than worldly and hypocritical rulers of the church who, by following the guidance of blind reason, endeavor to obtrude the figments of their own genius and human traditions instead of the word of God. For thus God according to his most free grace “reveals his mysteries unto babes, while he hides them from the wise and prudent” (Mt. 11:25). So he gives “to his disciples to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, which he denies to others” (Mt. 13:11). So “the secret of the Lord is with them that fear him” (Ps. 25:14). And “if any man will do the will of the Father, he shall know of the doctrine of Christ, whether it be of God, or whether he speaks of himself” (Jn. 7:17).
XXXVI. Since faith is not perfected in us in a moment, but is carried forward little by little and by degrees exerts itself, there is no absurdity in saying that a child or a Christian recently baptized, who has not yet seen or read the Scriptures, cannot at once elicit an act of divine faith concerning the infallibility of the Scripture formally considered; and that he can, not indeed doubt professedly through the ignorance of a depraved dispostion concerning its truth or falsity, but be simply ignorant whether such a Scripture is granted through an ignorance of pure negation; or believe it only by a human faith which is such, not indeed with regard to the object or the principle, but with regard to the argument and motive, as is merely human (namely the instruction and authority of parents or of the church itself), before he believes with divine faith (i.e., the divine arguments and motives drawn from the reading of the Scriptures). Besides, although a Christian recently baptized can be granted who does not yet know the Scripture formally and who consequently has as yet exercised no act of faith about it, no moment can be conceived in which (if he has the use of reason) he ought not to have some knowledge of the principal heads of religion contained in the Scripture, the belief of which is usually demanded from an adult to be baptized and from a baptized child as soon as he has reached the age of discretion (concerning which accordingly he can elicit an act of faith). But nothing can be opposed here concerning the impossiblity of an act of faith about the Scriptures in a Christian recently baptized that with equal (nay, with far better reason) cannot be retorted with respect to an act of faith about the church and its infallibility.
XXXVII. Although the authority, which according to us belongs to synods, is great, still it is not absolute and unlimited, to which we are bound to submit in blind obedience and without examination; rather it is limited and ministerial, depending upon a twofold condition. The first is that they decide nothing except from the word of God. The other, that they always leave to believers the liberty of the examination of their decisions. The clause of submission, appended to the letters to the synod, means nothing else when the churches protest that “they will submit themselves to all that will be determined in the sacred assembly, being persuaded that the Holy Spirit will be present there, and will lead its members into all truth and justice by the rule of his word.” For this evidently includes a tacit condition (to wit, that all the decisions will be made according to the rule of the word, from which if it is found to have departed, by that very circumstance all obligation to submission ceases). Therefore, this persuasion of the presence and guidance of the Holy Spirit is the persuasion of charity, which judges and hopes well of that assembly—that it will decide all things by the word of God—until the contrary appears. It also includes a tacit wish for that guidance. But it is not a persuasion of infallibility, implying absolute submission and excluding the right of examination. Nor can a favorable presumption which we can have concerning the learning and orthodoxy of those who constitute the synod hinder believers from being always bound (after the example of the Bereans) to examine whether whatever is decreed there is consistent with the Scriptures.
XXXVIII. Although the condition is not set forth in the letters expressly and explicitly, this reticence cannot be considered an illusion or equivocation and a mental reservation because that condition is understood rightly; it is natural and fundamental, flowing spontaneously from our principles and expressly maintained in Article 5 of our (French) Confession (Cochrane, 145–46) and other writings of our divines, so that it is obvious to everyone and cannot escape anyone’s notice. Now although the clause of submission has the force of an oath, it does not at once imply the certainty of infallibility because there are some oaths which are made concerning things done and past which ought to depend upon the certainty of things, not upon a mere presumption of them; others, oaths or promises of future things, which are founded upon presumption and include a tacit condition. The oath of fidelity which the soldier swears to his leader is founded only upon the presumption of the fidelity of his leader towards the prince and necessarily supposes this condition. It is the same with covenants which rest upon a similar presumption and always include a condition if not expressed, still tacit and implied.
XXXIX. Although the decision of a National Synod is final in the order of human means and from it there is no appeal to a higher tribunal and to it believers are bound in the external forum for the peace of the church and the preservation of good order (eutaxian), it is not on that account to be considered infallible, obliging the conscience itself, because the right to examine whatever is proposed for belief always belongs to the believer; nor does that decision bind the conscience further, except insofar as it will appear to it to be conformed to the word of God. But concerning the nature and power of those decisions, more will be said in the following questions when we treat of ecclesiastical power.
Turretin, Francis. 1992–1997. Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Edited by James T. Dennison Jr. Translated by George Musgrave Giger. Vol. 3. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing.