From Confession to Collapse: Fred Malone’s New Regulative Principle and Faulty Logic
Baptists and Presbyterians share a deep love for Christ and His Word. I write as a Presbyterian elder who has long respected my Baptist brethren as faithful gospel partners. Our differences on baptism, though significant, have not diminished my appreciation for their devotion. I offer this critique of Dr. Fred A. Malone’s book The Baptism of Disciples Alone, aiming to clarify truth rather than sow division. Malone himself is a former Presbyterian minister who became Baptist; although he once practiced infant baptism, he later admitted that his “conscience screamed every time he sprinkled a baby.”1 His journey underscores how baptism touches the conscience and the covenant convictions of Christ’s followers. I engage Malone’s work out of a commitment to the Reformed standards we Presbyterians profess – not to attack a brother in Christ, but to respond to what I believe are serious misunderstandings in his argument.
Malone’s book presents a comprehensive case for credobaptism (believers’ baptism) over against paedobaptism (infant baptism). It traverses many issues (hermeneutics, covenant theology, exegesis of key texts, historical theology, etc.). In this post, however, I will focus on Malone’s foundational objection – his appeal to the Regulative Principle of Worship (RPW) as defined in the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the related reasoning by which he dismisses infant baptism. Malone claims that infant baptism violates the RPW and that paedobaptists rely on illegitimate “inferences” rather than explicit Scripture. These contentions form the linchpin of his case, and thus they merit careful examination. The critique will proceed as follows:
A summary of the Regulative Principle of Worship as defined by the Westminster Confession of Faith. This sets the stage by clarifying what the RPW actually entails in the Reformed tradition.
An analysis of Malone’s interpretation (or misinterpretation) of the RPW in his book. We will see that while Malone quotes the Confession accurately, his application of its principle to baptism is flawed and departs from the Confession’s intent. In particular, Malone misrepresents the role of “good and necessary consequence” (valid logical inference) in determining doctrine and practice.
A critique of Malone’s use of logic and inference. We will highlight several logical missteps in his argument: question-begging assumptions, special pleading against inference, and internal inconsistencies. Far from upholding Reformed principles, Malone actually undermines them.
A brief conclusion on how Malone’s approach departs from the Reformed hermeneutic he claims to uphold, and why a correct understanding of the RPW is fully compatible with the historic Reformed practice of infant baptism.
By concentrating on Malone’s primary objection, we hope to show that his argument against paedobaptism is built on a misused principle and a misunderstanding of Reformed theology. In doing so, we uphold that the Reformed confessions do not support Malone’s conclusions. As a fellow minister of the Word concerned for sound doctrine, I offer this critique in a spirit of charity, desiring unity in truth. Let us begin by outlining the regulative principle itself as our point of reference.
The Regulative Principle of Worship in the Westminster Confession
What is the Regulative Principle of Worship (RPW)? Simply put, the RPW holds that God may only be worshiped in the ways He Himself has commanded in Scripture. Anything not instituted by God for worship is not to be introduced by human imagination, ecclesiastical tradition, or mere pragmatism. The classic statement is found in the Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF) 21.1:
…the acceptable way of worshipping the true God is instituted by himself, and so limited by his own revealed will, that he may not be worshipped according to the imaginations and devices of men, or the suggestions of Satan, under any visible representation, or any other way not prescribed in the holy scripture.2
In other words, God-ordained worship must rest on God’s revealed instructions. We are not free to invent new elements of worship or derive them from God’s silence. Anything that God has not prescribed in Scripture as part of His worship is forbidden – no matter how well-intentioned or “harmless” it may seem. This principle sets Reformed worship apart from the so-called normative principle, which permits any practice not explicitly prohibited. The Reformed RPW rejects that approach, insisting instead that only what is explicitly commanded or can be deduced by necessary implication from Scripture is allowable in worship. In short: only elements of worship that have scriptural warrant (either by direct precept or by clear implication) are to be used; all else is excluded as “imaginations and devices of men.”
It is crucial to understand that the Westminster Confession builds this principle on the foundation of sola Scriptura. WCF 1.6 (Of Holy Scripture) teaches that Scripture is sufficient and complete in revealing God’s will, both in what is explicitly written and in what can be rightly inferred. It states:
The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men.3
This foundational paragraph affirms that good and necessary consequence (i.e. valid deduction from Scripture) is a legitimate and even necessary part of how we know God’s will. Not every doctrine or duty is spelled out in a proof-text; some truths are implicitly contained in Scripture and must be discerned by “sound deduction” from the Bible. A prime example of this is found in Jesus’ teaching in Matthew 22:31–32, where He proves the resurrection of the dead from Exodus 3. One will search Exodus 3 in vain for any explicit mention of resurrection. Yet Jesus draws a necessary inference from God’s statement: “I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob” (Exodus 3:6). There has been some healthy debate among interpreters as to how exactly Jesus inferred the resurrection from this passage. My own view is that Jesus inferred the resurrection from the unfulfilled status of the land promise, which requires Abraham’s bodily resurrection in order for him to inherit the earth. But however Jesus arrived at that conclusion, the critical fact remains that He did infer an essential doctrine that was not “expressly set down” in Exodus 3, and He rebuked the Sadducees for failing to reason from it properly: “You are wrong, because you know neither the Scriptures nor the power of God” (Matthew 22:29, ESV). The failure was not with the clarity of revelation, but with their refusal to draw out its unavoidable implications. Christ’s correction demonstrates that good and necessary consequence is not a secondary or optional tool—it is essential to faithful biblical reasoning. Likewise, principles for New Testament worship are gleaned from the pattern and precepts of Scripture taken as a whole.
In fact, the regulative principle itself is an example of a doctrine established by necessary inference. No single verse declares, “Thou shalt include in worship only what God explicitly commands.” Rather, Reformed theologians see the RPW as the inescapable conclusion of multiple scriptural teachings: for instance, God punished Nadab and Abihu for offering “unauthorized fire” in worship (Leviticus 10:1–3); God commanded Israel not to add to His instructions (Deuteronomy 12:32: “Everything that I command you, you shall be careful to do. You shall not add to it or take from it.”); and Jesus condemned human traditions in worship (Matthew 15:9: “in vain do they worship me, teaching as doctrines the commandments of men”). Taken together, such passages imply that God’s silence is prohibitive, not permissive, in matters of worship. If God did not institute a practice, we have no right to include it in the worship of Him. The Westminster divines codified this principle in WCF 21.1.
To illustrate the RPW’s application: elements like prayer, the singing of Psalms, the reading and preaching of Scripture, and the sacraments of baptism and the Lord’s Supper are all explicitly or implicitly commanded in the New Testament for the gathered church. Therefore, they are included in worship. In contrast, practices such as incense, vestments, images, extrabiblical holy days, drama performances, etc., have no New Testament warrant and thus are excluded as “devices of men” or as part of the abrogated Old Testament ceremonial system. Even the circumstances of worship (like the time and place of meeting, seating, lighting) are carefully distinguished from elements – circumstances may be ordered by “Christian prudence” (WCF 1.6) but must never be turned into new rites or required observances.
In summary, the Regulative Principle of Worship (RPW) safeguards the church’s worship by binding it to God’s revealed will. We are commanded to do only what God has instituted, and we are forbidden to introduce anything He has not. This principle was a defining mark of Reformed churches in the 16th and 17th centuries, standing in contrast to the inventions of Roman Catholicism and the compromises of Anglicanism. Crucially, the RPW recognizes that God’s will is made known not only through explicit commands but also through good and necessary consequence drawn from Scripture. Unfortunately, Malone sidesteps the real issue at the outset by suggesting that infant baptism actually violates the RPW. This is a bold claim, especially considering that the Westminster Confession of Faith explicitly affirms infant baptism as part of the Reformed system. This position was held not only by the Westminster Divines but by virtually the entire Reformed world throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. Are we to believe that the Reformed, who codified the RPW with such care, simply forgot their own principle when they included infant baptism? Did they fail to rightly understand the very principle they articulated? Or is the misunderstanding on Malone’s part? Let us now examine his argument.
Malone’s Misinterpretation of the Regulative Principle
Fred Malone appeals to the regulative principle as a key plank in his argument against infant baptism. He notes that Baptists and Presbyterians historically share the same RPW. In fact, he laments that many in both camps have forgotten this common heritage. Malone writes:
Baptists have held historically to the very same regulative principle of worship as paedobaptists, though many in both camps are forgetting that today. The fact is that Baptists ultimately practice the baptism of disciples alone because of a more consistent application of the regulative principle…. Those Baptists who are tempted to forsake our Baptist Zion for more comfortable Presbyterianism may not realize that they must violate the Presbyterian (and Baptist) regulative principle of worship to do so.4
According to Malone, the only difference between the camps is that Presbyterians fail to apply the RPW consistently in the case of baptism. He asserts that infant baptism is not commanded by God and therefore violates the RPW, whereas believer’s baptism (“the baptism of disciples alone”) is the only form positively instituted in Scripture. He forthrightly states his thesis:
It is my belief that the regulative principle of worship, stated so clearly in the Presbyterian Westminster Confession of Faith and 1689 London Baptist Confession, requires instituted revelation to authorize infant baptism, not by silence or inference.5
In Malone’s view, unless we can point to a chapter-and-verse where God explicitly commands or exemplifies infant baptism, we must regard the practice as an unwarranted human addition – something “by silence or inference” rather than by divine institution. Since Scripture has no verse saying “baptize infants,” Malone concludes that paedobaptism stands condemned by the RPW.
To bolster his case, Malone quotes WCF 21.1 (the regulative principle statement) as we did above, and then explains it in his own words. He emphasizes that nothing may be introduced into worship on the grounds of human reasoning apart from Scripture. For example, he writes:
This regulative principle teaches that God-approved Christian worship only includes elements and practices “instituted by God Himself … limited by his own revealed will … [and not] any other way not prescribed in the holy Scripture.” In other words, speculation, invention, imagination and uncommanded practices cannot be permitted to overrule written revelation; this includes the argument of inferential silence.6
Malone’s summary here is accurate up to a point. Certainly, the RPW forbids “speculation, invention, imagination” in worship. We cannot justify a practice merely because Scripture is silent about prohibiting it – that would be the normative principle, which Reformed churches reject. Malone is also correct that our confessions limit worship to what God has instituted in His Word. However, the critical phrase is his last line: “this includes the argument of inferential silence.” Here Malone conflates logical inference with “silence.” He implies that a practice built by inference is on the same footing as a practice built on silence – both, in his mind, are illegitimate unless backed by an explicit text. But this is a misrepresentation of the Confession. The Westminster Confession certainly rejects an argument from silence (saying “Scripture doesn’t forbid X, so we can do X”). It does not reject argument from good and necessary consequence. In fact, it explicitly endorses inference (WCF 1.6). By lumping paedobaptists’ biblical inferences under “inferential silence,” Malone effectively rules out any use of inference in establishing a practice. That is not what the Confession teaches.
Malone doubles down elsewhere, insisting that only direct biblical institutions count. He argues that the sacraments must be explicitly instituted by Christ, “not by silence or supposed good and necessary inference,”7 for them to be valid elements of worship. In summary, Malone’s position is: if something isn’t explicitly commanded or exemplified in the New Testament, we have no warrant to do it – especially regarding a sacrament. By that standard, infant baptism fails because “there is no written revelation commanding or illustrating the baptism of infants, only that of professing believers. Thus, disciples-alone baptism describes the only instituted baptism in the entire Bible.”8 In his eyes, infant baptism is an uncommanded practice smuggled into worship on a faulty inferential basis.
Having presented Malone’s view in his own words, we can now assess where he has misinterpreted the regulative principle and the Westminster Confession’s intent. Several observations are in order:
Malone’s application of the RPW contradicts the Confession’s teaching on “good and necessary consequence.”
By treating all inferential reasoning as suspect “silence,” Malone misrepresents the Confession he quotes. The RPW as framed in WCF 21.1 does not forbid using logical deduction from Scripture. On the contrary, the Confession’s hermeneutic (WCF 1.6) requires the church to deduce truths from Scripture by good and necessary consequence. Ironically, the regulative principle itself is a product of such deduction – as noted above, it is not proof-texted verbatim but inferred from the general tenor of Scripture. If Malone were consistent, he would have to label the RPW an “illegitimate inference” and reject it by his own standard, since no single verse explicitly says what the RPW says. Of course, he doesn’t reject the RPW; instead, he selectively rejects inference when it leads to a conclusion he disfavors (infant inclusion in baptism). This selective skepticism toward inference is not grounded in the Confession, but in Malone’s personal theological preference. It results in a self-defeating position: he embraces the RPW on the basis of necessary inference, but denies necessary inference when it would support paedobaptism. In effect, Malone accepts the fruits of inference for defining worship (e.g. that we must only include what God commands) while denying the use of that same inference to determine whom to baptize. If inference is disallowed in determining the subjects of baptism, by the same logic it should be disallowed in determining the elements of worship at all – which would collapse the RPW. Thus Malone’s stance, if pressed consistently, undermines the very principle he is trying to defend.
The Westminster Confession plainly permits and even requires doctrinal inferences, contra Malone’s implication that inference = “invention.”
WCF 1.6, cited above, could not be clearer: truths “by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture” are as much a part of God’s revealed will as those “expressly set down.” Malone himself acknowledges that “reason, logic and deduction are involved in the interpretation of the Scriptures”9 and he even cites the doctrine of the Trinity as a valid inference.10 Yet, when it comes to the sacraments, Malone sets up a special rule that necessary inferences are essentially off-limits. This creates a striking inconsistency. If one grants that something as foundational and essential to the Christian faith as the Trinity — the very doctrine that distinguishes Christianity from heresy — must be affirmed on the basis of good and necessary consequence rather than an explicit proof-text, how absurd would it be to forbid the same principle from applying to practices in worship? To say that inference is good enough for formulating the creedal boundaries of orthodoxy, but not sufficient to determine who should receive baptism, is to apply two contradictory standards of reasoning. The result is a hermeneutic that elevates inference when it serves Malone’s purpose but dismisses it when it challenges his position on the sacraments.
He warns that treating deduced doctrines as binding can lead to “erroneous additions” to Scripture – likening it to the Roman Catholic elevation of tradition. But this is attacking a straw man. Reformed paedobaptists agree that we must not add human traditions or fallible conjectures to God’s Word. The real question is whether the inclusion of infants in covenant baptism is an “erroneous” deduction or a good and necessary consequence of Scripture. Malone assumes it is merely an unwarranted tradition, essentially begging the question against paedobaptists. The Confession, for its part, places no asterisk on WCF 1.6 excluding the “subjects of sacraments” from the scope of valid inference. In fact, the Westminster Assembly that penned these words went on to affirm infant baptism in its standards – which shows that they believed the practice to be necessarily contained in Holy Scripture, not an extra-biblical addition. Malone’s insistence that the RPW “requires instituted revelation” such that inference is not sufficient for a practice is simply not found in the Confession’s text. What the Confession forbids is “any other way not prescribed in holy Scripture.” The crucial issue, then, is whether infant baptism can be shown to be “prescribed in holy Scripture” in some form (for example, by apostolic precedent or by necessary implication). Reformed paedobaptists argue that it is; Malone says it is not. But one cannot settle that by fiat. By equating “not expressly commanded” with “forbidden,” Malone misconstrues the RPW. The principle forbids what is not warranted in Scripture – and a warrant may come via explicit command or by good and necessary consequence. The Confession itself was formulated through careful deductions from Scripture; to discard deduction as a reliable guide is to undermine the Confession’s own method.
Malone falsely characterizes the paedobaptist argument as an “argument from silence,” whereas in reality it is an argument from Scripture’s positive teaching.
A major plank in Malone’s case is the claim that infant baptism rests on nothing more than the absence of a prohibition. He repeatedly uses the phrase “inferential silence” to suggest that Presbyterians say, “Well, Scripture doesn’t explicitly forbid baptizing infants, so we can do it.” That would be a poor argument (and indeed not the Reformed one!). But this portrayal is a caricature. Paedobaptism is not based on a vacuum; it is based on biblical and covenantal inferences drawn from substantial evidence. We argue from the continuity of God’s covenant dealings, the inclusion of believers’ children in the covenant community, the giving of the covenant sign to infants, the connection between circumcision and baptism, the pattern of household baptisms in the apostolic era, and the absence of any revocation of the principle that believers’ children belong to the people of God, among other things. These points form a positive, interwoven case. In other words, we argue from what Scripture says (about covenants, signs, households, etc.), not from what it doesn’t say. Malone’s dismissal of this as “possibly erroneous inference” without seriously engaging the premises is classic question-begging. He asserts that even if paedobaptism were a “plausible consequence of certain Scriptural teachings,” it would still “contradict all that Scripture positively institutes… concerning the subjects of baptism which is expressly set down in Scripture.”11 But whether infant baptism truly contradicts Scripture’s teaching on baptism is precisely the issue under debate! Paedobaptists do not concede that their view contradicts the Bible; rather, we believe the Bible, rightly understood, includes infants in the visible covenant and thus in its signs. Malone has assumed what he needs to prove – namely, that Scripture “expressly” teaches that only professing believers should be baptized. By presuming that as a given, he can label any contrary deduction a contradiction and an “erroneous addition.” This is a logical fallacy. The real question is exegetical: what do the Scriptures actually teach (explicitly or implicitly) about who should be baptized? One must deal with Genesis 17, Acts 2:39, Colossians 2, the household baptism narratives, Jesus’ blessing of little children, etc., and show why these do or do not imply infant baptism. While Malone does go on later in the book to address various biblical and theological matters, he effectively poisons the well from the start by arguing that infant baptism violates the Regulative Principle of Worship. In his initial presentation, he largely sidesteps the relevant scriptural texts and instead attempts to use the RPW as a shortcut to exclude infant baptism a priori. This approach short-circuits the biblical debate. It would be akin to a paedobaptist claiming, “There is no explicit verse saying ‘only professing adults may be baptized,’ therefore believer-only baptism violates the RPW”—a poor argument, since our Baptist brethren do offer biblical reasons for their view, such as the pattern of disciple baptism in the New Testament. Each side must engage the actual biblical case of the other. By mischaracterizing the paedobaptist position as a mere argument from silence, Malone avoids doing just that.
Malone’s use of the RPW is inconsistent and selectively applied.
As mentioned, Malone embraces necessary inference for many doctrines but carves out an exception when those inferences would support paedobaptism. This inconsistency becomes clear when we consider other practices Malone himself (as a Reformed Baptist) would affirm:
The Lord’s Day (Sunday) as the Christian Sabbath: There is no express New Testament command, “Thou shalt worship on the first day of the week instead of the seventh.” The practice of Lord’s Day corporate worship rests on apostolic example (Acts 20:7; 1 Cor. 16:2), the 4th Commandment, and the theological significance of Christ’s resurrection on the first day. In other words, it is established by good and necessary consequence, not by a direct proof-text. Yet virtually all Reformed Baptists, Malone included, hold that Sunday is the proper weekly day of worship by inference. If Malone were to apply his “explicit command only” criterion here, one might argue that observing Sunday as the Sabbath is an “uninstituted practice” – which he would rightly reject. He recognizes the validity of inference in this case.
Women partaking of the Lord’s Supper: Malone attempts to anticipate the objection that his version of the RPW would rule out practices the church universally accepts, such as women partaking of the Lord’s Supper. However, he fails to recognize that his own inclusion of women is itself an inference. Nowhere does the New Testament explicitly state that women received the communion elements. The institution narratives record only men—the disciples—partaking. And yet the church rightly infers, based on broader biblical principles such as the equal standing of men and women in Christ and the corporate language of 1 Corinthians 11, that female believers are to be included. By Malone’s hyper-strict standard, one could object that we have “no express command or example” of women at the Lord’s Table, and therefore serving them would violate the RPW. Such a conclusion would be not only unwarranted but absurd—and it exposes how Malone’s rigid demand for explicit warrant, if applied consistently, would unravel even our shared and unquestioned practices.
Qualifications for Elders: Scripture requires an elder to be “the husband of one wife” (1 Tim. 3:2). Reformed interpreters universally infer from this that polygamists are barred from church office and that an elder must be morally faithful to his wife. Yet no verse explicitly says “polygamists cannot be elders” or “an elder must not be in an adulterous second marriage,” etc. We understand those requirements by necessary consequence. This is an application of Scripture’s teaching that everyone accepts without a direct verse for each detail. It is not a “human tradition” to exclude a polygamist from eldership; it is a valid inference from biblical principles of marriage and leadership. If one applied Malone’s no-inference-for-practice rule here, it would cast doubt on such qualifications that are not chapter-and-verse explicit.
The Regulative Principle of Worship itself: As already noted, the RPW is not spelled out in a single verse of Scripture. We derive it by collating various passages and drawing a doctrinal conclusion. Jesus never uttered a direct command summarizing the RPW formula. Instead, we infer it. Malone champions the RPW as biblical, but by his own methodology one might ask, “Where is the express command for the regulative principle?” If he were truly consistent in disallowing doctrinal conclusions that aren’t explicitly stated, he would have to be skeptical of the RPW’s authority as well. He is not – demonstrating again that he does trust necessary inference in general, but is making a special exception when it comes to baptism.
These examples show that Malone does in practice accept the authority of inferences in many areas of “faith and life.” But when an inference challenges his Baptist views of baptism and worship, he suddenly requires an explicit proof-text. This double standard suggests that his methodology is driven by his conclusion (credobaptism) rather than the conclusion being reached by a fair application of his methodology. In short, inference is binding for him in cases A, B, and C, but “forbidden” in case D – which is not a principled stance. The Westminster Confession certainly does not share such hesitation about inference: it treats necessary consequences as fully binding truth, part of the “whole counsel of God” on any matter of faith, including the sacraments.
Malone’s appeal to WCF 21.5 is misplaced and does not support his exclusion of infants from baptism.
At one point, Malone references Westminster Confession 21.5, which lists the “parts of the ordinary religious worship of God” (such as the reading and preaching of Scripture, prayer, singing, the sacraments, etc., all “instituted by Christ”). He seems to imply that because WCF 21.5 says the sacraments are instituted by Christ, we must have an explicit command from Christ to baptize infants—otherwise, administering baptism to them would not be truly Christ’s institution. This is a misunderstanding of the Confession’s intent. WCF 21.5 is simply enumerating the elements of worship and noting that baptism and the Lord’s Supper were ordained by Christ. It is not laying down a new hermeneutical rule that every aspect of those sacraments must be explicitly described in Scripture. The Confession does not say, “each part of worship must be established only by express command and never by inference.” It assumes, as elsewhere, that Scripture’s warrant may be explicit or implicit. That is the point of 1.6. The subjects of baptism, in particular, are addressed later in the Confession (WCF 28) where infant baptism is affirmed as scriptural. So Westminster clearly did not believe they were violating their own regulative principle by deducing infant baptism – they saw it as supported by Scripture. Malone’s reading of “instituted by Christ” in 21.5 as “must have an explicit command or example from Christ” is an extrapolation of his own. It goes beyond the Confession. All WCF 21.5 means is that baptism and communion are ordinances that Christ established for the church (which everyone agrees – Christ commanded the practice of baptism and the Supper). It does not address who is to be baptized; that is dealt with in theological inference from Scripture’s teaching on the covenant. Thus, Malone is loading extra meaning into WCF 21.5 that the divines did not intend.
Similarly, Malone criticizes a Presbyterian writer (Andrew Sandlin) for saying that teachings deduced by good and necessary consequence “are as binding as those taught plainly and explicitly.” Malone calls this an “extreme, unqualified statement” and argues WCF 1.6 “does not say” that. But in fact, WCF 1.6 does imply exactly that—if a doctrine is truly a good and necessary consequence of Scripture, then to deny it is to deny the teaching of Scripture itself. The Confession doesn’t put inferred truths in a secondary category; it simply insists we must be sure our inferences are valid and our premises sound. Sandlin’s point (in context) was that paedobaptists hold their view as a binding scriptural truth, not a mere suggestion, because they believe it is deduced from Scripture. Malone’s quarrel should be with whether the deduction is valid, not with the general notion that a valid deduction carries authority. By warning so strenuously against “possibly erroneous deductions,” Malone creates a false dichotomy: either a teaching is explicitly stated in Scripture or it’s a human tradition. The Confession offers a third category: teachings implicitly in Scripture, which are not human inventions at all but God’s truths. The Westminster divines warn against adding inventions or traditions, yes—but they also warn against neglecting or rejecting whatever is truly contained in Scripture, whether explicitly or implicitly. As noted above, Jesus Himself demonstrated this in His debate with the Sadducees: He proved the doctrine of the resurrection by inference from God’s statement “I am the God of Abraham…” (Matthew 22:31–32). And Jesus rebuked them for failing to draw that inference, saying “You are wrong, because you know neither the Scriptures nor the power of God” (Matt. 22:29). Here Christ holds people accountable for recognizing a doctrinal truth that was not explicitly stated but was necessarily implied in Scripture. That is essentially the hermeneutic of WCF 1.6 being modeled by our Lord. If Jesus can treat an unstated premise as authoritative truth (“God is not the God of the dead, therefore Abraham lives”), we ought not dismiss necessary inferences with a wave of the hand. Yet Malone’s approach, if consistently applied, would label Christ’s argument “unsafe,” since Exodus 3 didn’t expressly mention the resurrection. This highlights how Malone’s rigid insistence on explicit proof-texts is out of step with the biblical pattern of teaching by implication.
In light of the above points, Malone’s use of the regulative principle against infant baptism can be seen as a distortion of the principle. He has taken a sound rule—do only what Scripture warrants—and redefined “warrant” to mean “only what is explicitly commanded or exemplified.” By that redefinition, he attempts to win the debate by default. But that is not a fair test. The real test is: Does Scripture, when all is considered, indicate that believers’ children are to be included among the baptized? Paedobaptists believe the indications are there. Malone believes those indications are not valid and that the lack of an explicit infant baptism narrative is decisive. This is an exegetical disagreement, not merely a methodological one—and even on the methodological front, Malone has erred by misrepresenting the Confession’s stance on inference.
To summarize: Malone’s reading of the RPW is too rigid at some points and too lax at others – rigid in disallowing legitimate inferences that the Confession permits, and lax in that he himself continues to rely on inference when it suits him. The regulative principle, properly understood, does not say “only what is expressly commanded,” but “only what is prescribed in Scripture” – whether by command, example, or necessary deduction. When Malone says infant baptism is supported only by “possibly erroneous inference,” he is assuming it is erroneous. But if infant baptism is in fact contained in the fabric of Scripture (as Reformed paedobaptists maintain), then practicing it is not worshiping God “in a way not prescribed,” but in a way He has revealed by implication. Thus, Malone’s charge that paedobaptism violates the RPW falls flat. The Westminster Confession itself would side against Malone here: it uses necessary inference to derive doctrines of worship, and the Westminster divines practiced infant baptism, seeing it as warranted by Scripture. Malone is, in effect, wielding the regulative principle against the very confession that articulated it. This misinterpretation of the RPW undercuts Malone’s primary objection.
However, beyond misinterpreting the principle, Malone also commits several logical errors in his argumentation. We turn now to a critique of those errors in his use of logic and inference.
Logical and Hermeneutical Errors in Malone’s Argument
Having addressed Malone’s misuse of the regulative principle itself, we now examine flaws in the logical and hermeneutical approach he employs. Malone’s reasoning contains subtle fallacies that significantly weaken his case. Below are several key issues:
First, Malone’s argument is question-begging—assuming what it needs to prove.
He repeatedly claims that infant baptism “contradicts” the express teaching of Scripture on baptism, or that it is an addition with no biblical basis. But that is precisely the point under debate. By declaring at the outset that only disciples can be baptized according to Scripture, Malone is presupposing the very conclusion he wants to argue for. For example, he writes that even if one could infer infant baptism from Scripture, it would still “contradict all that Scripture positively institutes… concerning the subjects of baptism which is expressly set down in Scripture.”12 This presumes that Scripture expressly sets down a rule excluding infants—yet no verse states such an exclusion. The New Testament shows baptisms of professing believers (as we all agree), but it does not expressly address the status of believers’ infant children except by broader principles. By claiming contradiction, Malone simply asserts that the paedobaptist inference cannot be valid, rather than demonstrating it. This circular reasoning appears elsewhere as well: he dismisses the paedobaptist case as a “string-of-pearls” inference based on disparate texts, implying it’s an arbitrary patchwork. But whether passages like Genesis 17, Acts 2:39, Colossians 2:11–12, etc., legitimately connect to baptism is the very issue to be resolved by exegesis. To call it a tenuous “string” without showing why each link is faulty is to prejudge the outcome. In short, Malone often assumes his exclusivist credobaptist interpretation as a given and then uses that assumption to ridicule any contrary inference as unbiblical. This is not sound logic; it is begging the question.
A related aspect of this fallacy is Malone’s tendency to cast infant baptism in the worst light by association. He compares paedobaptist reasoning to the Pharisees’ practice of “stringing together” verses to create man-made laws, or to Roman Catholics adding traditions. This guilt-by-association implies that infant baptism stands or falls with those flawed methods. But this, again, assumes what must be proven—namely, that paedobaptism is like those cases of false inference. Reformed paedobaptists would strongly disagree; we believe our inferences are drawn from the analogy of faith in Scripture, not from verses wrenched out of context or from extra-biblical traditions. The Pharisees erred by basing doctrines on human traditions and distorted interpretations (Mark 7:7–9); the question is whether paedobaptism is a distortion or a valid deduction. By conflating all inference with Pharisaical invention, Malone creates a false equivalence. Proper use of necessary consequence must be distinguished from abuse of it. Otherwise one could dismiss any doctrine inferred from Scripture (the Trinity, for example) on the grounds that “the Pharisees inferred things too!” That would be absurd. It is the quality and source of an inference that matters, not merely the fact that inference is used. Malone often speaks as if any inference in worship matters is automatically suspect; this is not rational argument but an unwarranted bias that preempts careful evaluation of the inference in question.
Second, Malone employs a double standard in his treatment of scriptural inference.
We have already highlighted how he inconsistently allows inference for some doctrines/practices (e.g. Sunday worship, the regulative principle itself) but disallows it for infant baptism. To reiterate, this is a methodological inconsistency. Either we accept that Scripture teaches by implicit consequence as well as explicit statement, or we don’t. Malone says he accepts that general principle, but then he creates an exception around baptism. He suggests that because baptism is a “New Testament sacrament instituted by Christ,” we must have an express command or clear example for anything related to it, and that it’s “unsafe” to rely on inference in such a case. But where did this rule come from? Certainly not from Scripture or the Confession. It appears to be special pleading. If we applied the same rule uniformly, we would have to jettison many settled applications of doctrine (as shown with examples above). The new covenant does not explicitly re-command everything that continues from the old covenant; often we discern continuity by theological reasoning. For instance, the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15 had to infer from Old Testament prophecy and the work of the Spirit what rules Gentile converts should follow. They used principled inference, under guidance of the Spirit, to apply God’s Word to a new problem. In 1 Corinthians 11, Paul reasons from creation and nature to apply principles for worship practice in Corinth—again, inference and application beyond chapter-and-verse citation. The point is, continuity and discontinuity between Old and New Covenants must be discerned by examining Scripture as a whole, not by a blunt rule that only what is explicitly repeated carries forward. Malone’s stance is inconsistent with how we handle many biblical doctrines. He is strict about baptism in a way he is not strict about other matters—indicating a bias.
Perhaps the most striking inconsistency in Malone’s approach is that he relies on a chain of inferences to defend credobaptism while simultaneously dismissing the inferences drawn by paedobaptists. His argument is not based on explicit statements but on conclusions inferred from narrative patterns—such as the claim that only professing believers were baptized, that infants are excluded because they cannot profess faith, and that references to “disciples alone” being baptized imply a binding, normative rule. None of these conclusions is explicitly stated in Scripture; they are inferential constructs drawn from the data. The disagreement, then, is not over whether inferences are permitted—Malone clearly uses them—but over which premises are warranted by sound exegesis and whether the conclusions drawn follow necessarily. Reformed paedobaptists begin with different exegetical premises, such as the continuity of the covenant and the inclusion of believers’ children, and draw different conclusions by the same logical process. The debate should therefore focus on the quality of the exegesis supporting the premises and the validity of the deductions that follow. Yet Malone inconsistently treats his own inferential conclusions as virtually unquestionable—at times even labeling them “expressly set down”—while characterizing the opposing inferences as speculative or illegitimate. This asymmetry is not only methodologically flawed but logically indefensible.
Third, Malone’s stance ends up self-contradictory.
He affirms the principle of good and necessary consequence in theory (because he must, to maintain orthodoxy and the RPW), but he effectively denies its application in this particular doctrinal question. In practice, he is saying: “We should use inference to derive doctrine—except here, where it challenges what I believe.” This is a contradiction. If the Bible can teach truth by implication, then we are obligated to follow those implications wherever they lead, even if that challenges our tradition. If the Bible cannot be trusted to teach by implication, then we must abandon a host of important doctrines that we currently hold. Malone wants to hedge: to allow inference generally, but effectively disallow it for determining the subjects of baptism. The Westminster Confession does not countenance such a carve-out. It says the whole counsel of God on all things necessary is either explicit or implicit in Scripture. It makes no exception, certainly not for the sacraments. Malone’s reasoning here actually flirts with undermining the sufficiency of Scripture. By insisting that only an “express institution” can authorize a practice, he implies that Scripture’s implicit teaching is insufficient to establish obligation—even if it is truly implicit in Scripture! That is a startling implication. Sola Scriptura means we believe and obey not only the letter of the text but also the necessary implications of the text. If God’s Word implies something, we are bound to it. Malone’s approach would have us say to God, “Unless You stated it in so many words, I am not bound to believe or do it.” But God expects us to use sanctified reason, comparing Scripture with Scripture, to draw inevitable conclusions. When Jesus rebuked the Sadducees, He essentially held them accountable for not drawing a necessary inference. Thus, ironically, Malone’s restrictive approach could be seen as a subtle denial of the fullness of sola Scriptura. He elevates a certain view of sola Scriptura (“only the text, no inference”) that the Reformers and the Confession did not hold. Reformed theology has never been “the Bible and nothing else” in the sense of ignoring implications—it has always been “the Bible properly interpreted, by sound rules of exegesis and logic.” Malone’s version of the regulative principle, by disallowing that proper interpretation via inference in this case, actually departs from the Reformed approach he claims to champion.
To put it another way: Malone is using the regulative principle as a kind of trump card to avoid examining the actual biblical evidence for infant baptism. By saying “no explicit command, case closed,” he tries to make any further discussion moot. But this move contradicts the very regulative principle he cites, which depends on drawing inferences from Scripture. If Malone consistently applied his demand for explicit proof to the RPW itself, he would have to abandon the RPW (since it isn’t explicitly summarized in one verse). He doesn’t do that. Thus his position contains an internal tension: he limits inference only when it is convenient to do so. That is not a stable logical position.
Fourth, Malone fails to distinguish between inference and speculation.
In his warnings, he frequently speaks of “inferential silence,” “supposed inference,” and “possibly erroneous conclusions” as if any inference is just a guess that might conflict with Scripture. But an inference drawn necessarily from Scripture is not speculative—it is the voice of Scripture on that point. The Confession carefully says “good and necessary consequence,” not just any consequence we might dream up. Malone rightly cautions that not everything people claim as an inference is truly warranted. We must test inferences by Scripture (the analogy of faith) and sound reasoning. On that, we all agree. But he goes further and essentially treats all paedobaptist reasoning as dubious inference by definition. This clouds the issue. The remedy for bad conclusions is not to forbid inference; it is to practice better exegesis and logic. We don’t throw out the baby with the baptismal water, so to speak. If some have abused inference to introduce false doctrines, the answer is to refute those false inferences with Scripture and/or by exposing where they violate the rules of logic, not to ban inference altogether. Malone’s heavy-handed rejection of “inference alone” as a basis for doctrine ignores the crucial distinction between a false inference (which has no authority) and a necessary inference (which carries God’s authority). The Westminster divines explicitly recognized this distinction. They did not believe they were adding human speculation when they drew doctrinal conclusions logically from Scripture; they believed those conclusions were as much God’s truth as if chapter and verse stated them. The correct safeguard is to ensure the inference truly arises from Scripture and does not contradict any part of Scripture. Malone actually states this principle himself (that a valid inference must harmonize with Scripture and not violate sound hermeneutics). But then he arbitrarily adds an extra constraint: that even a harmonious inference doesn’t count unless there is also an explicit command. That extra constraint has no scriptural or confessional basis. It is Malone’s own hedge born of caution—but a caution that actually stifles the way Scripture communicates. In reality, a “good and necessary inference” from Scripture is not an addition at all. It is the Word of God in its meaning. Malone’s rhetoric about “adding erroneous deductions to revelation” only applies if the deductions are indeed erroneous. We certainly don’t want to add falsehood. But if a deduction is valid, we are adding nothing – we are simply understanding what God has already given. By conflating “inference” with “invention,” Malone paints with far too broad a brush.
Having identified these errors in Malone’s reasoning, we can better understand why his case against infant baptism fails to convince. It is built on a methodological restriction that is foreign to Scripture and to Reformed theology. It assumes what it should prove, applies standards inconsistently, and ultimately contradicts itself. A sound approach would be to grant, as the Confession does, that Scripture may teach us by implicit instruction, and then to carefully weigh whether infant baptism is one of those teachings. That means engaging the scriptural evidence, not excluding it a priori. Malone, unfortunately, short-circuits that process by an overly simplistic use of the regulative principle.
Exegesis, Logic, and the Certainty of Inferred Doctrine
Underlying Malone’s hesitancy about “good and necessary consequence” is a confusion about the role of exegesis versus the role of logic in arriving at truth. Malone himself admits, “To be sure, we all use human deductive reasoning to determine that which is expressly set down in Scripture.”13 But this is a category mistake. If something is expressly set down in Scripture, then it does not require deduction in order to be known. Deduction, by definition, is the process of drawing conclusions that are not explicitly stated but necessarily follow from what is stated. By suggesting that deduction is required to establish what Scripture already states explicitly, Malone not only blurs the difference between exegesis (the task of discerning what a text directly says) and inference (the task of reasoning from what the text says to what necessarily follows), but he also shows confusion about what deduction itself actually is.
Clarifying this will further show why his argument about certainty is misplaced. When discussing inferences, Malone draws a distinction between a “necessary consequence” and a “plausible inference.” He implies that the Westminster Confession’s term consequence means an inescapable, clear conclusion, whereas speaking of inference (as some theologians do) might suggest a merely plausible case. In reality, there is no difference: a “good and necessary inference” is exactly the same as a “good and necessary consequence.” The Confession uses the word consequence, but 20th-century theologian John Murray, for example, used the word inference interchangeably. Both terms mean a conclusion drawn from premises. A necessary inference is one that logically must be true if the biblical premises are true.
Malone, however, seems to think that anything arrived at “by inference” is automatically less solid or clear than something “expressly set down.” He writes, for instance, “Neither plausible inferences nor deducted consequences attain to this level of certainty”14 (speaking of the certainty required to institute a practice). In that statement, he conflates plausible inferences (which indeed are tentative) with necessary inferences (which, if truly necessary, carry real certainty). We must untangle this. The certainty of a doctrinal conclusion depends on two factors: (1) that the premises on which it is based are true (which is established by proper exegesis of Scripture), and (2) that the reasoning from those premises is logically valid (established by sound logic). If both are in place, then the conclusion is not merely probable but rises to the level of a good and necessary consequence, as the Confession of Faith expressly teaches (WCF 1.6). Such a conclusion is therefore as certain and binding as any explicit statement of Scripture, because it is itself a teaching of Scripture. If either factor is shaky—if we misinterpret a text or if our deduction is invalid—then the conclusion will be neither good nor necessary, and therefore uncertain or false.
Logic itself, when properly applied, is not a matter of probability or guesswork. A necessary logical consequence follows inevitably. For a simple example: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal. The conclusion is 100% certain given the premises. There is nothing speculative about it. The only room for error would be if one of the premises were false (if Socrates were not actually a man, etc.). So in theology: if we accurately understand Scripture’s statements (premises), and the conclusion flows by valid necessity, then the doctrine is true and binding. Our hesitation about some inferred doctrines does not stem from any inferiority in the method of inference itself, but from a desire to ensure that we have not misunderstood Scripture or based our reasoning on false premises. In practice, clearer texts help guide our interpretation of less clear texts—that is the analogy of faith. If someone claims a “necessary inference” that appears to conflict with another clear teaching of Scripture, we reevaluate the argument—either the inference was not truly good and necessary, or the premises themselves were flawed. This is how we guard against erroneous deductions.
Malone’s concern, it seems, is that paedobaptists are elevating something he considers a possibly erroneous deduction (“infant baptism is warranted”) to the level of God’s command. He fears treating a fallible human inference as if it were God’s Word. That is a fair caution in general—we must never bind consciences to human opinion. But the million-dollar question is whether the inference in question is fallible human opinion or a warranted divine instruction. By simply asserting it’s fallible, Malone dodges the work of demonstrating it. His blanket rule of “no inference for sacraments” appears to be an attempt to avoid that inquiry altogether. Yet the only way to know if an inference is erroneous or not is to test it by Scripture and the rules of logic, not to outlaw inference as a category. The Confession invites us to do just that: search the Scriptures diligently, and whatever by good and necessary consequence is deduced is to be received.
Therefore, when Malone argues that inferred doctrine is inherently a step down in certainty, he is not quite right. A truly inferred doctrine (i.e., one that must be true if Scripture is true) has maximal certainty. The early church recognized this: for example, the Council of Nicaea deduced from various scriptures that the Son is of one substance with the Father. That word “homoousios” (of one substance) is not in the Bible, but the concept is a necessary inference from biblical truths. To deny it is to fall into heresy. It’s as binding as if 1 John said, “Jesus is of one substance with the Father.” Of course, not all doctrines carry that level of clarity or weight; but the method is sound. We derive necessary doctrines by combining and reasoning from Scripture.
In the case of baptism, paedobaptists believe that the inclusion of believers’ children is a strong inference from the covenantal structure of redemption revealed in Scripture. We acknowledge it’s not explicitly commanded in one verse; if it were, this debate wouldn’t exist. But we see it as “necessarily contained” in the good news that God saves us and our households, the way He consistently deals with families in covenant (absent any reversal of that principle in the New Testament). Malone disagrees. Fine. Then the debate should center on exegesis—what do those passages teach? Instead, Malone moves the debate to the meta-level: “inference vs. express command,” and declares inference out of court. That move is what we find logically flawed and confessionally unwarranted.
A doctrine “by good and necessary consequence” is not a second-class truth. The Westminster Assembly certainly didn’t think so; they would include, for instance, infant baptism in that category of necessary consequences from Scripture. Malone’s argument about certainty ultimately reduces to his confidence (or lack thereof) in the paedobaptist exegesis, but he frames it as an issue of principle. It would be more honest to simply say, “I don’t think the Bible actually implies infant baptism, and here’s why…” and then discuss the texts. By arguing instead that “even if it did imply it, we shouldn’t accept it without an express command,” Malone not only skirts the real issue but also distorts the teaching of the Westminster Confession of Faith and undermines the very method by which we derive many doctrines.
Having considered both Malone’s misinterpretation of the regulative principle and his logical missteps, we can now conclude by reflecting on the broader significance of this debate and the importance of a correct hermeneutic.
Conclusion
Fred Malone set out to prove that infant baptism is a clear violation of the regulative principle of worship, implying that Reformed paedobaptists—despite professing sola Scriptura and adhering to the Westminster Confession—have introduced a human tradition into God’s worship. Upon close analysis, however, it turns out that Malone is the one departing from the Reformed hermeneutical principles. He has misused the RPW, treating “good and necessary consequence” as if it were not truly a part of God’s revelation. In doing so, he inadvertently undercuts the sufficiency and authority of Scripture, which includes both explicit teachings and those implicit in the text. His argument, far from exposing paedobaptists as inconsistent, has exposed his own inconsistency: he invokes Westminster and sola Scriptura, but then he selectively denies the very interpretive method those standards uphold.
Throughout this critique, I have focused on Malone’s ideas and reasoning, not on him personally. Malone is our brother in Christ. I acknowledge his earnest desire to honor God’s Word and protect the church from unscriptural practices. In fact, I share that desire. Where we differ is in what the Scripture actually teaches about baptism. Malone’s zeal to eliminate “inventions” led him to see infant baptism as an unwarranted invention, but in the process he sawed off the branch he was sitting on. By disallowing the kind of scriptural reasoning that produced the regulative principle (and many other doctrines), Malone’s approach would force us to turn a blind eye to much of God’s counsel unless it is proof-texted. The Reformed faith calls the church to receive the whole counsel of God—express or implied. It cautions equally against adding human traditions and against neglecting any truth Scripture contains. Malone’s heavy emphasis on the former caution (don’t add practices) led him to neglect the latter (don’t reject Scriptural truth, however it is taught).
From a pastoral perspective, my concern is that sincere Christians not be misled into a false dilemma. Some may think, after reading Malone, that to be a true Biblicist who honors the regulative principle, one must reject infant baptism. But that is not the case. The very divines who formulated the regulative principle and sola Scriptura were paedobaptists, and they saw no conflict there. You can hold wholeheartedly to the RPW and still believe that Scripture (by good and necessary inference) directs us to apply the covenant sign to believers’ children. Our Baptist friends disagree with that inference, of course—but they should recognize it is an inference from Scripture, not an addition based on silence. And labeling it a violation of the RPW is a terrible misunderstanding of the principle.
In the end, what is at stake is not only the practice of baptism but our approach to Scripture itself. Do we embrace all that Scripture teaches, however it teaches it? Malone’s approach would unconsciously encourage a truncated sola Scriptura—one that only accepts explicitly stated doctrines and is suspicious of the rest. That has never been the Reformed stance. The true distinction lies not between what is explicitly stated and what is inferred, but between valid, necessary inferences from sound premises and illegitimate or faulty deductions. The task of the church is to discern which is which, not to avoid deductions altogether. We must be like the noble Bereans, examining the Scriptures diligently to see if these things are so. If a doctrine or practice cannot be found in Scripture even by good and necessary consequence, then yes, it must be rejected. But if it can be found by rightful inference, then to reject it is to err.
My hope is that this critique has clarified the grounds of the debate and cleared away some misunderstandings. In closing, let me affirm that I respect Fred Malone’s scholarship and his conviction. We Presbyterians share the goal of a pure church, even if we differ on the status of our children within that covenant community. These are deep waters of theological discussion, and we do well to handle them with care and charity. We should be able to rigorously debate matters of doctrine while maintaining brotherly love.
Finally, I invite readers on both sides to appreciate that neither view is trying to undermine Scripture. The Presbyterian paedobaptist sincerely believes he is following Scripture’s covenantal logic, not man’s ideas. The Baptist sincerely believes he is adhering to Scripture’s clear examples and commands, guarding against human addition. Both are aiming to be biblical; we differ in our interpretation. Recognizing that can foster mutual respect even as we continue to wrestle with the texts. In that spirit, let us all continue to reform our practices according to the Word of God—the whole Word of God, in its explicit instructions and in its implicit teachings. May our worship and our doctrine be pleasing to the Lord, and may our unity in Christ overcome our differences as we together seek to glorify God “in spirit and in truth.”
Fred A. Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone: A Covenantal Argument for Credobaptism versus Paedobaptism (Cape Coral, FL: Founders Press, 2003), vi.
Westminster Assembly, The Westminster Confession of Faith: Edinburgh Edition (Philadelphia: William S. Young, 1851), 113–144.
Westminster Assembly, The Westminster Confession of Faith, 18
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, 152.
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, xiv.
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, 153.
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, 154.
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, 36-37.
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, xvi.
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, xvi: “The doctrine of the Trinity, for example, is certainly a good and necessary consequence deduced from Scriptures which speak of God as One yet in three Persons equally divine (Matthew 28:19; John 1:1).”
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, 21.
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, 21.
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, 19.
Malone, The Baptism of Disciples Alone, xvi.
Yeah, "Waters Of Creation" by Douglas Van Dorn was infinitely better than Fred Malone's book.